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Essay on Transcendental Realism
Introduction
The object of realist metaphysics is generally thought to be to describe the structure of the  
world as it is in itself, or, alternatively, to determine precisely what is real. The purpose of  
this essay is to suggest that, although there have been many attempts to achieve this goal, 
they all fall down, not simply because they have misconstrued the nature of the in-itself or 
precisely what is real, but because, more fundamentally, they are not clear about what it is 
to talk about the in-itself or the real. In short, contemporary realism, both continental and 
analytic, does not have an adequate concept of reality.
To demonstrate this point, I am going to rehearse a couple different dialectics between 
realist and non-realist positions in order to tease out their inherent problems. This will take 
up the first  two parts  of  the essay.  In  the first  part  I  will  tackle Quentin  Meillassoux’s  
reconstructed dialectic of  correlationism, and identify some key problems with it. In the 
second  part  I  will examine  several  different  debates  within  analytic  metaphysics  that 
exhibit  a  common dialectical  structure,  within which I  will  locate a position that  I  term 
deflationary realism. 
The final two parts will bring together the various considerations that have arisen, to show 
how we can move from deflationary realism to a properly  transcendental  realism,  in 
which the task of realist metaphysics is made properly explicit. In the third part I will define 
transcendental realism, and outline an argument for it. In the fourth part I will try to work 
out some additional consequences of the position, while further situating it in relation to the 
history of philosophy. In particular, I will try to show why the considerations put forward in  
the essay motivate a return to, and radicalisation of, the Kant’s philosophical project.
Part I: The Classical Dialectic
To begin with, I am going to briefly introduce the classical dialectic between realism and 
idealism, and show where what Meillassoux calls correlationism stands in relation to it. To 
this end I am going to introduce a series of definitions:-
Classical Realism: Any position that takes there to be a real structure of the world that is 
ontologically independent (and thus distinct from) the structure of thought. This position 
is exemplified by thinkers such as Aristotle and Locke.
Classical Idealism: Any position that takes there to be a real structure of the world that is in 
some  sense  identical  to  (and  thus  ontologically  dependent upon)  the  structure  of 
thought. This position is exemplified by thinkers such as Berkeley and Hegel.
This opposition can also be described in terms of how the two positions view the relation 
between subject and object, or that between thought and being. In each case, realism 
takes the latter to be primary, and to be  independent of the former, whereas idealism 
takes the former to be primary, and the latter to be dependent upon it. Given this, we can 
introduce correlationism as the position which gives primacy to neither subject or object, 
but to the relation between the two:-
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Correlationism: Any position which holds that the real structure of the world is to some 
extent  unknowable,  insofar  as  knowledge  is  always  relativised  to  the  subjective 
conditions of knowledge (e.g., forms of intuition, cultures, or language-games, etc.). This 
means that there can be no access to the world as it is in-itself, but only as it is for-us. 
This position is exemplified by Kant, Heidegger and Wittgenstein.
It  is  important  to  note  that  whereas  realism  and  idealism  are  defined  in  explicitly  
ontological terms,  even if  they  have  epistemological consequences,  Meillassoux takes 
correlationism to  principally  be an  epistemological position.  This does not  mean that 
there cannot be ontological forms of correlationism (e.g., the later Heidegger’s notion of 
Ereignis as the appropriation of Man to Being and Being to Man), but it does hold that  
correlationism can be motivated independently of ontology. This will turn out to be a crucial 
point.
In the subsequent discussions we will  seek to determine the meaning of three crucial  
notions that appear within these definitions: reality, the in-itself, and the structure of the 
world.
1. Meillassoux on Correlationism
Meillassoux takes it that correlationism defeats both realism and idealism, by deploying a 
different  argument  against  each:  the  circle  of  correlation against  realism,  and  the 
argument from facticity against idealism.
i) The Circle of Correlation
Meillassoux takes Fichte’s initial account of consciousness in the  Wissenschaftslehre to 
provide the most basic form of the circle of correlation:-
Fichtean Consciousness: The I (subject) posits the not-I (object) as not posited. 
In essence, consciousness thinks about the object, and attempts to think the object as 
independent of its thinking. However, it ends up in a  pragmatic contradiction. The fact 
that it  posits the object contradicts the content  it  posits,  namely,  that the object is not  
posited.
Meillassoux  holds  that  all  forms  of  classical  realism  display  the  same  pragmatic 
contradiction.  They  try  to  think the  object  as  it  is  independent  of  thought.  This  is 
impossible,  because  one  cannot  have  knowledge  of  anything  independently  of  the 
subjective conditions of knowledge. One cannot know if the in-itself is either the same as 
or  different from the way it appears under these conditions. This is what constitutes the 
unknowability of the in-itself.
ii) The Argument from Facticity
Classical  idealism  is  immune  to  the  circle  of  correlation,  because  it  absolutises  the 
correlation  itself.  It  identifies knowing with  what  is  known,  and  thereby  denies  the 
possibility that the in-itself could be different from how it is for-us. We thus can know the 
real  structure  of  the  world,  because  it  is  the  same  as  the  subjective  conditions  of 
knowledge, or the structure of thought.
2
To refute the idealist, the correlationist needs to shore up the possibility that the in-itself is 
different from the for-us. This is done by insisting on the facticity of thought. This is to 
say, the existence of thought is taken to be contingent. Given that there must be a real 
structure of the world, this implies that there can be a world without thought, and thus that  
they are not identical.
iii) Speculative Materialism
Meillassoux motivates his own neo-realist position by hijacking the argument from facticity. 
Whereas the idealist absolutises the correlation, Meillassoux absolutises facticity. He does 
this  by  showing  that  the  argument  against  idealism  only  works  on  the  condition  that 
thought  can think  its  own contingency  as  an  absolute,  i.e.,  as  something  that  is  not 
relative to the conditions of its thinking. In order for us to know the non-identity of in-itself 
and the for-us, we must be able to know absolutely that there could be a world without 
thought. We must thus have some absolute knowledge of the possible.
However,  because we can still  have no absolute  knowledge of  particular  entities,  this 
means that in order for thought to be absolutely contingent, everything must be absolutely 
contingent. This leads to a position, which he calls speculative materialism, in which we 
can know the real structure of the world, but this structure is just the structure of the radical 
contingency of everything. 
2. Problems with Correlationism
There are at least three distinct issues with Meillassoux’s presentation of correlationism.
i) Propositions Vs. Concepts
First, the Fichtean account of thought is ambiguous as to whether ‘thinking X’ is a matter of 
thinking a proposition about X or grasping the concept of X. A proposition provides the 
content of an isolated claim about something, whereas a concept can incorporate a variety 
of such contents, as long as they are sufficient to individuate its object.
For example, it is ambiguous as to whether ‘thinking Bill Clinton’ is a matter of thinking a 
specific thing about Bill Clinton, such as ‘Bill Clinton is ladies man’, or a matter of grasping 
who Bill Clinton is. Alternatively, it is ambiguous whether ‘thinking mytochondria’ is a matter 
of thinking something like ‘mytochondrial DNA is inherited from the mother’ or a matter of  
grasping a series of facts that specify what mytochondria are.
ii) Presentation Vs. Representation
Secondly,  the  argument  is  not  sensitive  to  an  important  distinction  between  different 
accounts of the structure of thought. This is best demonstrated by taking a quote from 
Meillassoux:-
No  X  without  givenness  of  X,  and  no  theory  of  X  without  a  positing  of  X...  the 
sentence ‘X is’, means: ‘X is a correlate of thought’.
What this demonstrates is that Meillassoux runs together accounts of thought in which 
objects are initially presented to us in a certain way (e.g., phenomenological accounts of 
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thought, such as Husserl’s), and accounts in which we must  always represent them as 
being a certain way (e.g.,  linguistic accounts of thought, such as Sellars’).
For example, say we encounter a tree in the park and we make an observation statement 
about  it  (e.g.,  ‘this  tree is  green’).  The difference between the two approaches is  that  
presentational accounts take the content of that observation to have been already given 
to us in our experience of the tree, and that the statement just makes it explicit, whereas 
representational accounts holds that only the observation statement has content,  and 
that, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a ‘content’ of experience.
The  crucial  difference  between  these  approaches  is  that  representational  accounts 
emphasise the way that we are responsible for the way we take things to be, insofar as 
we must  actively represent them as being some way, whereas presentational accounts 
tend to diminish this responsibility, by treating us as more or less passive.
iii) Two Forms of Dependency
Finally, we can see that the dialectic of correlationism is structured around two different 
questions about dependence upon the structure of thought. 
On  the  one  hand,  there  is  the  question  of  whether  the  in-itself is  ontologically 
dependent upon the structure of thought. This is the primary dimension of the debate 
between  classical  realism  and  classical  idealism.  Correlationism  sides  with  classical 
realism on this issue, holding that the in-itself cannot be dependent upon thought because 
of its facticity.
On the other hand,  there is the question of whether  our  knowledge of  the in-itself  is 
epistemically dependent upon the structure of thought. This is the debate over whether 
we can know anything  absolutely, or whether all knowledge is  relative. Correlationism 
sides with relativism on this issue.
The crucial point is that the correlationist makes the following assumption:-
Sufficiency Thesis: the ontological independence of the in-itself from thought is sufficient 
to establish the possibility that the in-itself could be different from the way it appears in 
relation to thought, and thus to establish epistemic dependence.
The problem with this thesis is complicated. To understand it, it is necessary to recognise 
that the circle of correlation does not tell us how exactly the content of thought is relative 
to  its  subjective  conditions  (or  structure).  In  other  words,  it  doesn’t  explain  what  this 
relativity  consists in. The problem with the sufficiency thesis is that it only holds if it is  
supplemented  by  such  an  explanation.  This  is  even  more  problematic  than  it  initially 
appears, because the essential features of thought that such an account would take to be 
potentially absent in the in-itself, must be accounted for in ontological terms. In essence, 
the  correlationist  requires  an  ontological  account  of  thought,  because  only  such  an 
account can draw consequences from the ontological fact about the independence of the 
in-itself from thought. The real problem here is that such an account would undermine the 
simplicity, and thus the force of the circle of correlation itself.
The real weakness of Meillassoux’s approach is that its understanding of the notion of the 
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in-itself,  for all  that it is supposed to support an  epistemological argument, is always 
implicitly ontological.  This  is  already  indicated  in  the  way  Meillassoux  situates 
correlationism between classical realism and classical idealism: the former gives Being 
primacy over  thought,  the  latter  gives  thought  primacy over  Being,  and correlationism 
gives  primacy  to  the  relation  between  the  two.  The  classical  positions  both  view  the 
relation  between  thought  and  Being,  and  thus  the  question  of  primacy,  in  explicitly 
ontological terms. In defining correlationism in the terms he does Meillassoux guarantees 
that whatever its epistemological consequences are, it will always be based on some form 
of implicit ontology.
Viewing  the  argument  in  this  way  also  lets  us  understand  the  relationship  between 
Meillassoux’s  speculative  materialism and  Graham  Harman’s  object-oriented 
philosophy  (OOP).  In  effect,  both  positions  try  to  draw  out  the  implicit  ontological 
assumptions  underpinning  the  correlationist  argument.  Meillassoux  recognises  the 
ontological  character  of  the  assumption  that  thought  is  factical,  and  then  because 
correlationism still precludes knowledge of particular entities, he extends this facticity to all 
entities. Harman on the other hand recognises the ontological character of the epistemic 
dependence of thought about the object upon its subjective conditions, and then, for the 
same reason as Meillassoux, he extends this structure of all entities (or objects). 
The problem for both speculative materialism and OOP is that their arguments only work if  
there is some independent reason to accept correlationism beyond the very ontological 
assumptions they draw out of it. However, as we have seen, correlationism requires such 
ontological assumptions to motivate it. This is not to say that both of these ontological  
positions are false, only that they need to be motivated by different arguments.
In the next  two parts  of  the essay I  will  expand upon this problem with Meillassoux’s 
presentation of correlationism:-
1) I will show that there is a non-ontological way of conceiving the dependence of the 
structure of the world upon the structure of thought. This allows for a further position 
between classical realism and classical idealism, which I call deflationary realism.
2) I will provide an alternative account of thought, which provides us with a way of  
understanding epistemic dependence in a non-ontological manner. This allows for 
a further position which I call transcendental realism.
Part II: Deflationary Realism
I will now examine a series of different debates in analytic metaphysics, within which I will  
uncover a common dialectical structure, and use this to introduce  deflationary realism. 
Unfortunately,  I  will  have  to  ignore  much  of  the  context  and  specific  detail  of  these 
debates, and will present them in a somewhat truncated form. Nonetheless, it should still 
be apparent that there is a common philosophical theme running through them.
1. Local Deflationism
Whereas the classical debate between realism and idealism is about the real structure of 
the world as a whole, each of these debates deals with a specific aspect of this structure. 
We will thus make a distinction between global and local metaphysical debates. It should 
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be noted that we still have not yet come across a good definition of this notion of ‘the real  
structure of the world’, and so it is even less clear what an ‘aspect’ of it would be. However, 
examining these debates will bring us closer to understanding both.
i) Numbers (Quine)
The first debate is a disagreement over whether a particular domain of entities exists, or 
whether they are  real. We’ll take numbers as our example, given that they provide the 
most tried and tested example of such debates in the history of philosophy.
The debate initially takes place between local realism about number (traditionally called 
platonism), and local anti-realism about number (traditionally called nominalism). Both 
are forms of classical realism, insofar as both take there to be a real structure of the world 
independent of thought, and both hold that there are  some domains of entities that are 
real, and thus part of this structure. For instance, both tend to think that physical objects 
are real. The difference is that the platonist thinks that numbers are just as real as tables  
and chairs, whereas the nominalist thinks they are not.
Now, the deflationary realist steps into this traditional debate and opposes both forms of 
classical realism. In this instance, the deflationist is none other than Quine. Quine holds 
that there is nothing more to existence than existential quantification, and that there is 
no notion of  reality distinct  from  existence.  In  effect,  Quine denies that  either  form of 
classical realism can make good sense of what they mean by ‘real’.
The major consequence of Quine’s view is that all ontological questions about whether or 
not a given domain of entities exists (or is real) become trivial questions about whether we 
take there to be true statements which quantify over that domain. For instance, if we take it 
to be true that ‘There are infinitely many prime numbers’, we are thereby committed to the 
existence of both numbers, and prime numbers more specifically. In essence, if we take 
there  to  be true  mathematical  statements,  then we’re committed to  the existence of 
mathematical objects.
Quine does qualify  this idea somewhat,  insofar as he thinks we should only  work out 
existential  commitments from those statements that do genuine  explanatory work. This 
means that we work out what exists only on the basis of the claims made by our best 
scientific theories. Nonetheless, it is important to point out that he does not take scientific  
claims possess a different kind of truth. 
There  are  many  problems  with  this  qualification,  and  with  Quine’s  characterisation  of  
ontological  questions  more  generally.  Kit  Fine  has  perhaps  provided  the  most 
comprehensive critique of the Quinean position. What is most interesting is that he uses 
this to motivate a thick notion of reality in opposition to Quine’s thin notion. However, Fine 
does not shake the problem of classical realism, insofar as his definition of reality (in the 
sense of realness) appeals to an intuitive but ultimately unexplained notion of Reality (in 
the sense of the world as it is in-itself). I will adopt something similar to Fine’s approach  
later on, but I will explicate the intuitive notion of Reality he appeals to (which I will call the 
Real). The other problem with Fine’s account is that he does not show how his notion of  
reality  can  be  extended  outside  of  debates  about  the  reality  of  particular  domains  of 
entities. As we will see from the two subsequent debates, this is a very important issue.
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Leaving all this to one side, we can translate Quine’s basic idea as follows:-
Quine Thesis: There is no  thick notion of reality for entities, but only a  thin notion. An 
entity is real in this sense iff we take there to be something true of it.
ii) Values (McDowell Vs. Blackburn)
The second debate is a disagreement over whether certain kinds of  predicates pick out 
real  properties.  The predicates in question are  values such as ‘good’,  ‘beautiful’ and 
‘funny’. In this debate, Simon Blackburn plays the role of the local anti-realist. He opposes 
his position, which he calls  quasi-realism about value, to what he calls  naïve realism 
about value, which is the corresponding local realism. 
The naïve realist supposedly holds that entities in the world are really imbued with values, 
independently of the way we take them to be. This means that a sunrise could be beautiful 
even if sentient creatures had never evolved, in just the same sense that it would still last  
the  same  amount  of  time  even  if  no  systems  of  time  measurement  had  ever  been 
invented. In opposition to this, Blackburn claims that the properties studied by the natural  
sciences are real, but that values are not. Instead, he holds that values are projected onto 
the world by us. The sunset is beautiful just in the sense that we project some positive 
reaction it produces in us upon certain genuine properties it possesses.
The deflationary realist in this debate is John McDowell, who classifies his position as anti-
anti-realism. The crux of the debate between McDowell and Blackburn is whether or not 
statements which predicate values of objects are truth-apt. For a statement to be truth-apt 
is just for it to be able to be true or false. Blackburn effectively tries to deny truth-aptness 
to value statements by showing how the ways we identify and argue about values fall short 
of the paradigm case of those properties studied by the natural sciences. 
In response to this, McDowell has a number of good points, but his central argument is  
that even if  value discourse can never have the form of natural  scientific  discourse,  it 
nonetheless displays all  the features characteristic of assessing the truth and falsity of  
claims. We can give detailed reasons for and against value-ascriptions, deploying whole 
networks  of  interconnected  value  concepts.  For  instance,  assessment  of  whether 
something is funny does not simply depend upon our dispositions to laugh at it, but can 
involve appeals to complex concepts like satire and irony.
In essence, McDowell  establishes  deflationary standards for what kinds of discourse 
count as truth-apt, and then denies that there is anything more to the reality of properties 
than there being true claims about them. On this basis, we can locate a parallel of the 
Quine Thesis:-
McDowell Thesis: There are only thin notions of reality and truth. A property is real iff we 
take some ascriptions of it to entities to be true.
iii) Modality (Lewis Vs. Blackburn and Price Vs. Brandom)
The third debate is harder to classify than the first two. It regards the reality of the modal 
dimension of the world,  or the reality of  possibility and necessity.  The problem with 
classifying this is that, although it can potentially be interpreted as a debate about whether 
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or not a certain kind of entity exists, namely, possible worlds, or as whether there are real 
modal properties, such as  dispositions, it is really more general than this. This can be 
demonstrated by considering two different versions of the debate, between David Lewis 
and Simon Blackburn on the one hand, and Huw Price and Robert Brandom on the other.
Taking  the  former  debate  first,  Blackburn  initially  attacks  Lewis,  who  is  famous  for 
advocating  the  reality  of  possible  worlds,  as  if  he  occupies  the  local  realist  position. 
Blackburn’s own view is that modal discourse is projective in a similar way to his view of  
value  discourse.  However,  Lewis’  response  to  Blackburn  reveals  that  he  is  in  fact  a 
deflationary realist. In effect, he accuses Blackburn of ascribing a thick notion of reality to 
the actual which he denies to the possible. By contrast, he is not claiming that possible 
worlds are real in the thick sense, but deploying a uniformly thin sense of reality on which 
the possible and actual are on equal footing. Lewis argues that we take modal claims (e.g., 
counterfactuals) to be true, and that we must thereby commit ourselves to the existence or 
reality of whatever is required to properly interpret their  truth. This means that we are 
committed to the reality of the elements we use to formulate the semantics of  modal 
discourse. For David Lewis, this means the reality of possible worlds.
The debate between Price and Brandom is parallel to this. Price takes up a similar quasi-
realist position to Blackburn, from which he criticises Brandom’s own modal realism. The 
question  of  whether  Price  is  actually  a  classical  realist  is  not  straightforward,  but  we 
needn’t answer it. This is because it is Brandom’s defense of his position against Price 
which gives him an affinity with Lewis. He explicitly denies that we can make any sense of 
the idea of a real structure of the world distinct from the structure of our thought and 
talk about it. He then maintains precisely the same position as Lewis: we are committed to 
whichever  features  of  the  world  we  need  to  make  sense  of  the  semantics  of  modal 
discourse.  The  main  difference  between  Brandom  and  Lewis  is  that  he  takes 
incompatibility  relations between  propositions  (and  the  facts  they  represent)  as  his 
semantic primitives, and thus is not committed to the reality of possible worlds.
What comes out of these related debates is that there can be aspects of the world not  
straightforwardly  reducible  to  questions  about  entities  and  their  properties.  We  can 
translate the basic ideas of Lewis and Brandom as follows:-
Lewis-Brandom Thesis: There is only a thin notion of reality with respect to aspects of the 
world. An aspect of the world is real in this sense iff we take there to be true claims about 
it. The nature of this aspect is determined by the semantics of those claims.
2. Global Deflationism
Now that we’ve had a look at the way deflationary realism functions within local debates,  
we can try to work out the general character of the position. An important point to make is  
that it is not possible to be a deflationist in one debate and not in another. This is because 
the deflationist’s tactic involves substituting a thick notion of reality for a thin one, and it is 
the  same notion  which  is  deployed in  all  these debates.  This  means that  if  one  is  a 
deflationary realist, one must be a global deflationary realist.
I think we can pick out three essential insights of deflationary realism from the debates just 
considered:-
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1) There is a crucial link between a thin notion of reality and the notion of truth (from 
the Quine Thesis).
2) To be genuinely deflationary, this notion of truth must be  equally thin (from the 
McDowell Thesis).
3) The structure of the world is reflected by the semantics of our truth claims. This 
means that the structure of the world is reflected by the structure of our thought 
and talk about it (from the Lewis-Brandom Thesis).
i) Brandom’s Deflationism
Now,  just  because  all  of  the  deflationary  realists  discussed  above  should have  a 
coherently articulated global deflationist position doesn’t mean that they do. The exception 
is  Robert  Brandom,  who  articulates  a  systematic  position  that  incorporates  all  three 
insights just discussed. Brandom does this by explicitly addressing the question of the 
dependency of  the  structure  of  the  world  on  the  structure  of  thought.  However,  he 
articulates  a  dependency  thesis  which  is  non-ontological,  and  which  thus  does  not 
collapse into  classical  idealism.  To do this,  Brandom introduces the  notions of  sense 
dependency and reference dependency:-
Sense Dependency: “Concept P is sense dependent upon concept Q just in case one 
cannot count as having grasped P unless one counts as grasping Q.”
Reference Dependency: “Concept P is reference dependent upon concept Q just in case P 
cannot apply to something unless Q applies to it.”
In short, P is sense dependent upon Q if one cannot understand P without understanding 
Q, and reference dependent upon Q if there cannot be P without Q. The former is a kind of 
epistemic dependence, whereas the latter is a kind of ontological dependence.
Brandom  then  points  out  that  there  can  be  sense  dependence  is  independent of 
reference dependence, meaning that there can be sense dependence without reference 
dependence. He also points out that sense-dependence is by default an  asymmetrical 
relation, meaning that there can be one-way sense dependence. For example, one cannot 
understand the concept ‘nail’ without the concept ‘hammer’, but it is entirely possible that 
we  could  destroy  all  hammers,  and  yet  there  would  still  be  nails.  Equally,  one  can 
understand ‘hammer’ without understanding ‘nail’, because hammers may be used to do 
things other than hitting nails.
We can then articulate Brandom’s position as follows:-
1) The  world is all that is the case, or the totality of what is true. This is the same 
definition  of  world  with  which  Wittgenstein  opens  the  Tractatus  Logico-
Philosophicus.
2) Thought is just the rational process through which we update and revise what we 
take to be true.
3) The  concept  of  world is  reciprocally  sense  dependent upon  the  concept  of 
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thought. This means that one cannot understand the structure of the world without 
understanding the structure of this rational process, or vice versa.
The consequence of this is that Brandom takes there to be various pairs of fundamental 
concepts that must be understood together or not at all. For instance, he thinks that we 
cannot understand what objects are apart from understanding what singular terms are, 
that  we  cannot  understand  what  properties are  apart  from  understanding  what 
predicates are, that we cannot understand what facts (or states of affairs) are apart from 
understanding what claims (or assertions) are, and he thinks that we cannot understand 
what laws are apart from understanding what counterfactual robustness is. 
This then allows him to make various claims about the structure of the world, on the basis 
of  claims  about  the  structure  of  thought  (which  for  him  is  just  the  semantics and 
pragmatics of language). For instance:-
1) Propositions necessarily have a  subject-predicate structure, therefore, the world 
must be composed of objects and properties.
2) Facts are just  true claims, and there are  normative truths, therefore there are 
normative facts.
3) There  are  modal incompatibility  relations  between  propositions,  and  between 
predicates, therefore there are modal incompatibility relations between  states of 
affairs, and between properties.
Now, it should be noted that Brandom actually calls this position ‘objective idealism’, and 
he takes it to be Hegel’s position, as well as his own (even if he does take himself to  
disagree with Hegel on the possibility of providing an exhaustive account of  logic, and 
thus  metaphysics).  However,  I  think  that  Brandom  is  incorrect  in  ascribing  this 
deflationary  position  to  Hegel,  insofar  as  Hegel  most  definitely  has  more  classical 
metaphysical ambitions when it comes to the applicability of his  Logic. I therefore take 
myself to be justified in classifying Hegel as a classical idealist (albeit the most powerful 
and subtle of them) and Brandom as a deflationary realist.
Moving on,  Brandom provides us  with  the resources to  posit  the general  definition of  
deflationary realism we are seeking:-
Deflationary Realism: Any position which denies that there is a thick sense of reality, and 
which holds that the structure of the world and the structure of thought are reciprocally 
sense dependent, without being reference dependent.
ii) Deflationism Vs. Correlationism
I have thus shown that it  is possible to have a position between classical realism and 
classical idealism that is not correlationism. Moreover, the possibility of this position tells 
against the  Sufficiency Thesis that the correlationist  argument depends upon. This is 
because the deflationist  can accept  that the world is  ontologically  independent from 
thought, and thus that there could be a world without thought. In short, the deflationist can 
accept the facticity of thought and still hold that the structure of the world is dependent 
upon the structure of thought (albeit reciprocally).
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It is thus the case that deflationary realism trumps correlationism. This means that the only 
way to  avoid  deflationary  realism is  to  answer  the  deflationist’s  challenge to  classical 
realism, by providing a genuinely  thick notion of  reality.  However,  this  thick notion  of 
reality must  not  appeal  to  the ontologically defined notion of the  in-itself deployed by 
correlationism,  lest  it  collapse  back  into  correlationism.  I  think  that  the  only  position 
capable of meeting this task is what I call transcendental realism. The rest of the essay 
will be devoted to expounding this position.
Part III: Transcendental Realism
Deflationary realism is an impressive position, especially when it is explicitly articulated in 
the form Brandom presents. However, I don’t think that it is right. There are a variety of 
reasons for this, some of which are specific to the various local debates we’ve considered 
(see Fine’s critique of Quine on existence), but the simplest and most compelling is that 
we seem to have an intuitive grasp of a genuinely thick notion of reality. This is obvious 
when  we  look  at  the  debate  between  platonism  and  nominalism.  We  have  a  good 
understanding of the difference between the positions, the problem is simply that no one 
has managed to make explicit the role that the term ‘real’ is playing in the debate. This is 
what lets the deflationist claim that the argument makes no sense.
The task before us is thus to explicitly define a thick notion of reality. However, in doing so 
we must also avoid defining reality in  ontological terms. This is because the notion of 
reality is actually supposed to make sense of what ontology is, not vice-versa. The only 
way to do this is to define reality in epistemological terms. This means providing a non-
ontological  account  of  the structure of thought,  and then showing that there is a thick 
notion  of  reality  implicit within  it.  I  take  this  to  be  the  essence  of  a  genuinely 
transcendental approach to realism. I will thus define transcendental realism as follows:-
Transcendental Realism: Any position that shows that the structure of thought itself implies 
that there is a real structure of the world in excess of the structure of thought.
It is important to note that this position is actually a development of deflationary realism, 
rather  than  a  simple  return  to  classical  realism.  This  can  be  seen  if  we  look  at  the 
dependence relations this definition implies.
For  transcendental  realism,  the  structure  of  the  world  is  sense-dependent  upon  the 
structure of thought, but the dependence is  not reciprocal. This looks strange, until one 
realises that  understanding the structure of  thought  is a  necessary but  not  sufficient 
condition of understanding the structure of the world. In short, one must understand the 
structure of thought in order to understand what it would be to give a proper account of 
the real structure of the world. This is what Kant would call the critique of metaphysics, 
which is supposed to come before metaphysics itself.
1. Rethinking Thought
I’m now going to suggest a way of motivating transcendental realism, and I’m going to do  
this by sketching an alternative account of thought to the one Meillassoux provides. The 
account of thought I’m going to present is based on the historical successor to Fichte’s 
account  of  consciousness,  namely,  Hegel’s  account of  Natural  Consciousness in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit.
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i) Hegel Contra Fichte
Hegel’s account is almost as simple the Fichtean one we considered earlier. It posits two 
basic features of consciousness:-
1) Consciousness relates itself to its object, or takes its object to be a certain way. 
What this means, is that it makes a claim about its object.
2) Consciousness distinguishes between its relating (or its claim) and the object as it is 
in itself. In essence, consciousness allows for the possibility of error.
These then have two implications:-
3) Because  consciousness  itself makes  the  distinction  between  its  claim  and  the 
object  it  is  about,  the  object  cannot  be  truly  in-itself,  but  must  be  for-
consciousness.  This  means  that  consciousness  must  have  a  concept of  its 
object.
4) However, consciousness cannot be aware that the object is for-it without ceasing to 
be  consciousness,  and  thus  must  suppress this  fact.  This  means  that 
consciousness cannot recognise that the concept of the object is dependent upon 
it, without undermining the possibility of error.
The first thing to recognise is that this account solves the two problems we identified with  
Meillassoux’s account of thought. First, the proposition/concept ambiguity of the Fichtean 
approach is resolved by having a role both for propositional claims about objects (1&2) 
and  for  concepts  of objects (3&4).  Secondly,  although  it  is  misleadingly  named 
‘consciousness’  this  is  most  definitely  a  representational account  of  thought. 
Consciousness is  active in making claims about its object, and is thus  responsible for 
those claims. Moreover, it undertakes this responsibility by establishing the object as an 
independent standard distinct from its claim. It is precisely by giving the object authority 
over whether its claim is correct that consciousness opens up the possibility of error.
The next thing to note is that Hegel has effectively split Fichte’s notion of ‘positing as not  
posited’ into two distinct subjective acts: what I will call  withdrawing authority (2), and 
suppressing the concept (4).
Withdrawing authority is just a different way of talking about the way consciousness opens 
up the possibility of error. The reason I am using this term is that granting authority to the 
object over whether one’s claims about it are correct can also be viewed as a matter of 
withdrawing one’s own authority over one’s claims. In doing so, one thereby undertakes a 
responsibility to provide reasons why one’s claim is correct if  challenged. It is precisely 
by undertaking a responsibility to give reasons for one’s claims about an object that one 
thereby undertakes a responsibility to that object. In effect, what all of this means is that all  
claims are essentially open to debate.
In contrast to this, the content of concepts is not always open to debate. This is because 
mutual  grasp  of  a  concept  is  a  condition  of  the  possibility of  disagreement  about 
anything. For example, we can only have a genuine argument about whether ‘Bill Clinton 
is a ladies man’ if we both understand who Bill Clinton is, and what being a ‘ladies man’ 
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entails. The point is that in order to open up the possibility of error, we must nonetheless 
exclude some  things  from  the  resulting  debate.  So,  while  we  accept  the  possible 
difference  between  the  our  claim and  the  object  in  itself,  we  suppress the  possible 
difference between our concept and the object it stands for.
ii) Mind Independence Vs. Attitude Independence
This account of the basic structure of thought gives us the resources to properly articulate 
epistemic dependence in a  non-ontological manner. We can do this by distinguishing 
between two different ways of understanding the notion of the in-itself: in terms of mind 
independence and in terms of attitude independence.
Mind Independence: Something is in-itself is if can exist independently of the existence of 
minds.
Attitude Independence: Something is in-itself if the way it is is independent of the way we 
take it to be.
The  former  is  an  ontological  understanding  the  in-itself,  whereas  the  latter  is  non-
ontological. Importantly, it is the fact that this is a  representational account of thought, 
rather than a presentational one, that makes this possible. This is because it enables us 
to  conceive  of  the  relation  between  subject  and  object  in  terms  of  authority and 
responsibility. In essence, the withdrawal of authority is a matter of establishing a form of 
attitude independence.
I would suggest that Meillassoux’s indifference to the distinction between presentation and 
representation,  and  Harman’s  dependence  upon  a  phenomenological,  and  thus 
presentational,  account  of  thought,  is  what  leads  them  to  adopt  the  ontological 
understanding of the in-itself. By contrast, the Hegelian model of thought enables us to 
adopt  the  epistemological  understanding  of  the  in-itself,  and  thus  to  undercut  the 
arguments for their respective ontologies.
On this basis, we may also reformulate the  intuition underlying correlationism in more 
exacting terms:-
Correlationist Intuition: The suppression of the concept prevents us from ever establishing 
the  absolute attitude independence of  the object  of  representation.  This means that 
whether or not our claims about the object are true is never completely up to the object,  
but is always  mediated by something that we, either as  individuals or as a community, 
have authority over.
iii) Types of Truth
Let us call this absolute attitude independence objectivity. For a claim to be objectively 
assessable is for its truth to be independent of any attitudes that anyone has ever had, or 
will have. This means that no claims about anyone’s attitudes can count as good reasons 
for taking it to be true. The correlationist intuition can then be understood as the claim that 
we are unable to objectively assess the truth of any claim.
Now, it is important to note that some truth claims are obviously not objectively assessable 
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in  this  way.  For  instance,  the  claim  ‘Harry  Potter  is  a  wizard’  is  not  assessable 
independently of our attitudes about Harry Potter. Indeed, there are claims such as ‘Harry  
Potter has a secret half-sister’ that we would take JK Rowling’s attitudes to have special  
authority over. In these cases, we can nonetheless have arguments about whether the 
claim is true, because we can still withdraw our own authority, even if we cannot withdraw 
JK Rowling’s.
In these cases we have established a form of relative attitude independence.
What this indicates is that in contrast to deflationary realism, which holds that there is only  
a single notion of truth, there are at least two kinds of truth: objective and non-objective 
truth. There thus is a  thin concept of truth which functions as a  genus and a variety of 
thick notions of truth which function as its  species. The withdrawal of authority and the 
attitude independence it establishes is the common form of truth, and the various ways 
this withdrawal is modified, producing a variety of forms of relative and absolute attitude 
independence, constitute the variety of types of truth. 
It is this insight which gives us the leverage we need to not only overcome deflationism, 
but to resolve many of the issues involved in the various local debates we considered:- 
1) The problems with Quine’s attempt to distinguish a privileged set of truth claims 
from which to work out ontological commitments can be overcome if  we posit a 
distinct type of truth. Instead of working out our ontological commitments from the 
set of scientific claims we take to be true, we can work it out on the basis of the set  
of claims we take to be objectively true.
2) The debate between Blackburn and McDowell can be resolved once we recognise 
that it is not a matter of whether both scientific and value discourse are truth-apt in 
the same sense, but a matter of determining the differences in the structure of these 
discourses which differentiate the types of truth-aptness they exhibit.
3) This will  give us the resources we need to extend the notion of  aspects of the 
structure  of  the  world  we  uncovered  in  the  debates  over  modality,  and  the 
connection between these and the semantics of discourse, by allowing us to break 
the  reciprocity of  Brandom’s pairs of  sense dependence of Brandom’s pairs of 
fundamental concepts. 
However, we will only be able achieve any of these goals if we can fight off the challenge 
to objectivity that the reformulated correlationist intuition represents.
iv) Conceptual Revision
The key to this is grasping two interconnected points. First, that our concepts are not fixed, 
but are  revisable. Second, that  the world itself  can sometimes  force us to revise our 
concepts. This makes the assessment of those concepts independent of our attitudes in a 
principled way.
First, it is important to recognise that the suppression of the concept is not irrevocable. It is 
possible for us argue about the content of our concepts, but doing so suspends the initial 
debates  which  those  concepts  were  a  condition  of.  In  short,  we  always  perform  a 
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suspension of representation in order to examine the  conditions of representation. 
The important point  is that we can never perform a  global suspension, but only  local 
suspensions. This is just to say that if we disagreed about  everything then we couldn’t 
disagree about  anything.  If  we are to  examine some concepts,  we must  always  use 
others.
Second, we must distinguish between two types of commitments one can undertake by 
making claims (and thus two types of claim):-
Objectual Commitments:  Undertaken by claims about specific  objects (e.g.,  ‘this liquid 
tastes  sour’,  and  ‘everyone  in  this  room  has  excellent  taste  in  philosophy’).  These 
constitute the content of  singular concepts  (e.g., ‘Bill Clinton is male’, ‘Bill Clinton was 
president of the US’, etc.).
Conditional Commitments: Undertaken by claims which make explicit  inferential rules. 
These constitute the content of predicate concepts (e.g., ‘if something tastes sour then it 
is an acid’ and ‘if something is an acid then it turns litmus paper red’).
It is to some extent obvious that we can be forced to revise our objectual commitments 
about objects on the basis either of  perception, wherein further objectual commitments 
are acquired, or of inference, in virtue of the rules relating the predicates used in them. It 
is thus to some extent obvious that we can be forced to revise our singular concepts.
However,  we  can  also  be  forced  to  revise  the  inferential  rules which  constitute  the 
content of our predicate concepts on the basis of perception. So, let us take the above 
example of the concept ‘acid’, which we will take to be constituted by the two inferential 
rules:-
1) If something tastes sour then it is an acid.
2) If something is an acid then it turns litmus paper red. 
Now, say that through perception we then acquire an objectual commitment of the form:-
3) This liquid tastes sour and it turns litmus paper blue.
We are now in a position where our perceptually acquired commitments  contradict the 
content  of  our  concept.  This  means  that  if  we  accept  the  truth  of  the  observation 
statements, we are forced to revise our concept of acid, by abandoning or modifying one 
or more of these rules.  This example of objective concept revision is deliberately very 
simple. The truth is that there is a lot more to the content of concepts, and thus a lot more 
to the structure of the process of revision. I cannot provide an exhaustive account of this 
structure  here,  but  I  will  provide  an  overview  of  how  this  picture  needs  to  be 
supplemented.
v) Dimensions of Conceptual Content
First of all, we have to get a bit more clear about what  concepts are. It is important to 
recognise Kant’s insight that concepts are rules for making judgments. It is also important 
to  recognise  Brandom’s  pragmatic  insight  that  we must  understand  the  propositions 
15
which form the contents of judgments in terms of the  assertions which express them. 
Since assertions are principally linguistic, this means we must understand them in terms 
of  the  sentences deployed  in  those assertions.  We thus  have  a  threefold  distinction 
between  the  pragmatic (assertion),  syntactic (sentence),  and  semantic (proposition) 
dimensions  of  thought  and  talk.  Kant’s  insight  thus  becomes  Sellars’  insight  that  to 
understand a concept is to understand the rules governing the use of a word in forming 
sentences which can be asserted, through which we express propositions. This is not only 
a representational, but a properly linguistic account of thought.
Given this, we can see that there is more to the content of concepts than the rules made 
explicit  by  inferential  commitments.  This  is  most  evident  in  the  distinction  between 
concepts governing the use of singular terms and predicates. The obvious move would 
be  to  understand  their  content  as  being  exhausted by  objectual  and  conditional 
commitments,  respectively.  However,  at the very least,  familiar  Kripkean problems with 
proper names (which  are  a  type of  singular  term)  imply  that  the  content  of  singular 
concepts cannot be understood as what is made explicit by objectual commitments alone. 
Indeed, as Putnam has shown, the problem is more general than this, insofar as it extends 
to  natural  kind terms (which  are  a type of  predicate).  What  underlies  both  of  these 
problems is  a  general  worry  about  how it  is  possible for  us  to  argue about  the rules 
governing the use of the same word (or the content of the corresponding concept), if what 
individuates that word (or concept) from its homonyms (which have distinct concepts, 
e.g., the ‘bank’ of a river from the ‘bank’ on the high street) is just these rules. In essence, 
there must be more to the individuation of concepts.
These  semantic externalist challenges require us to posit some additional mechanism 
whereby we can have some minimal grasp of the use of a word which fixes its identity,  
allowing us to argue about how that very word (as distinct from its homonyms) should be 
used. The classical way to do this is to posit a special set of claims that one must accept in 
order to count as understanding the concept. These are analytic claims, and there can be 
no genuine disagreement about them. Only the opposing  synthetic claims can support 
such genuine disagreements. I take Quine to have adequately demonstrated that there is 
no principled way of drawing this distinction, and thus take all claims to be synthetic. In the 
account I am presenting the intuitive boundary between analytic and synthetic is captured 
by conceptual suppression, wherein we hold the content of the concept fixed in relation 
to those claims that we open up for debate. The boundary is thus  dynamic rather than 
static, shifting relative to the focus of the debate. It is important to recognise that rejecting 
the  analytic/synthetic  distinction  in  this  way  is  a  condition  of  accepting  full  blown 
conceptual revisability.
The crucial point is to recognise that the additional mechanism required to respond to the 
semantic externalist  challenge must also make possible  semantic deference,  such as 
cases in which we use words of which we have a partial grasp, but can nonetheless defer  
to experts who have a fuller grasp. For example, it is possible for two lay people to have a 
fairly  interesting  discussion  about  black  holes,  even  though  they  only  have  a  partial 
understanding of what black holes are. It is even possible for them to disagree about bits 
of what they do understand, and nonetheless be still talking about the same thing. This is 
because they have the ability to  defer to physicists about the correct ways to use the 
word, or about what is true of black holes. There can be similar kind of debates about  
particular objects. For example, it’s entirely possible for me to talk about Bill Clinton, even 
if I’ve never met him, indeed, even if I couldn’t pick him out of a crowd, as long as I can  
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defer to the way others use the name ‘Bill Clinton’.
The answer to these problems, which Brandom goes a long way toward articulating, is that 
language use depends on an ability to keep track of relations of anaphoric dependence 
between different uses of words. The simplest kinds of such relations are exhibited by 
uses of anaphoric pronouns within and between sentences, such as in the sentence ‘Bill  
Clinton is  a  ladies  man,  but  he is  a  mediocre  saxophonist’.  Here  there  is  a  simple 
anaphoric relation between my use of the name ‘Bill Clinton’ and the pronoun ‘he’, where 
the latter gets its significance from the former. This is true regardless of who I pick out with  
the name ‘Bill Clinton’. I could be speaking about a different Bill Clinton than the former 
president of the US, but I’d still be claiming both that he is a ladies man and that he’s a 
mediocre saxophonist. The important point is that these kinds of relation, where one use of  
a word can inherit its significance from another, can extend between the uses of different  
speakers. Thus, if a friend of mine has never heard of either Bill Clinton, but I tell him that 
he is a mediocre saxophonist, when he goes on to tell other people about a saxophonist  
called Bill Clinton, he’ll be referring to whoever I was referring to, in virtue of a dependence 
relation  between our  uses of  the  term.  This  holds  equally  of  predicates as it  does of 
singular terms. It is by virtue of being able to track these kinds of anaphoric dependence 
relations that we can take each other to be using the same concept, even if we disagree 
about particular features of its content. It is also what enables semantic deference of the 
kind just discussed.
There is a further dimension of conceptual content which needs mentioning, which is the 
role that our practical understanding of things contributes to content of our concepts of 
them. This is an idea common to both Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein. As we’ve 
already noted, grasping a concept is understanding how to use a word. This is already a 
kind  of  practical  understanding.  Although this  understanding might  be  to  some extent 
explicit, for instance, we might have conditional commitments that  codify the inferential 
rules we follow in using the word, it will always depend upon some understanding that is  
implicit. This is the import of Wittgenstein’s rule-following regress. What it means is that  
shared concepts will always be dependent upon shared practices. Heidegger’s insight is 
that  these  shared  practices  for  using  words are  in  turn  dependent  upon  our  shared 
practices of dealing with the things that those words refer to. 
The real  significance of this is that whereas it  is possible for us to engage in  explicit 
concept revision, by first making explicit the content of our concepts and then putting 
them into question, it is also possible for there to be implicit concept revision, insofar as 
our  practices  for  dealing  with  things,  and  thus the  practices  for  using  words  that  are 
dependent upon them, can adapt to the things themselves. In the implicit case, the world 
indirectly forces us to revise our concepts, by causing us to change our practices. In the 
explicit case, the world  directly forces us by providing us with  good reasons to do so. 
The distinction is precisely one between causal and normative force.
On the basis of this, we can hold that in order to be counted as a rational subject, or as 
something that can genuinely think and talk about the world, one must be-in-the-world in 
something like Heidegger’s sense, or have a form-of-life in something like Wittgenstein’s 
sense.  This  is  because we are only  in  touch with  the  world  insofar  as  it  objectively 
constrains our thought about it, and this is the case only insofar as it can force us to  
either implicitly or explicitly revise the concepts we apply to it. This means that one needn’t  
be able to explicitly revise one’s concepts in order to be a rational subject, but that the 
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potential for acquiring the logical vocabulary (conditionals and negation) required to do 
so is nonetheless implicit within the abilities of such non-logical rational beings.
To  conclude  this  section,  we  can  thus  draw  a  distinction  between  the  primary and 
secondary dimensions of conceptual content.  Objectual and  conditional commitments 
make explicit the rules constituting the primary dimension of conceptual content. These 
provide the  representational core of the content of  singular and  predicate concepts, 
respectively. The secondary dimension of both kinds of conceptual content is articulated by 
the  anaphoric relations between particular uses of words and the  practical relations 
between the way we use things and the way we talk about them. These provide the non-
representational periphery of conceptual content, but they are no less essential to it. The 
reason for this is that the secondary dimension is what makes possible the revision of the 
first, and thus what lets it be properly  constrained by what it aims to represent. On the 
one hand, tracking anaphoric relation is what enables us to  disagree about the primary 
content  of  the  same concept,  and  thus  what  to  revise  that  primary  content  through 
argument. On the other, tracking practical relations is what enables the  things we deal 
with to constrain the way we use the words that correspond to them.
Providing  a  detailed  story  about  the  relation  between  the  primary  and  secondary 
dimensions of conceptual content is just describing the way the latter structures arguments 
about the former. Doing this is just a matter of giving a much more detailed account of the 
suspension of representation.
2. Objectivity
Moving on from the discussion of the content of concepts, we can now properly articulate a 
defence against the correlationist challenge.  The first thing to recognise is that although 
we  can  never  completely withdraw  authority  in  any  given  debate,  or  that  we  cannot 
perform a global suspension of representation, there is an ideal subset of our truth claims 
in which:-
1) There is no claim for which we cannot perform a local suspension, and thus bring 
the concepts it deploys into question.
2) There is no claim about the primary content of these concepts that cannot itself be 
suspended, bringing the concepts deployed in it into question. In principle (if not 
always in practice) there may be recursive suspension.
3) There are no claims about attitudes (e.g., ‘Pete believes that Bill Clinton is a ladies 
man’, ‘Most people believe that unicorns are white’, ‘The norse people believed that 
Thor is the son of Odin’, etc.).
4) There  are  no  claims  the  assessment of  which  bottoms  out in  claims  about 
attitudes (e.g., ‘Harry Potter has a secret half sister’, ‘Unicorns are white’, ‘Thor is 
the son of Odin’, etc.). 
This subset is just the set of objective truth claims, i.e., those things we take to be true 
independently of the attitudes anyone ever had or will have.
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i) Bottoming Out
To unpack this a bit more, this means that all objective assessment, or arguments about 
claims  within  this  subset,  including  all  arguments  about  the  primary  content  of  the 
concepts deployed within these claims (and by recursion, all arguments about the primary 
content  of  concepts  that  these  depend  on),  cannot  deploy  claims  about  attitudes  as 
reasons.  The only exception to this are claims in which there are further reasons why 
those attitudes are authoritative that do not ultimately depend upon claims about attitudes 
for which we cannot in turn supply such further reasons. This is what it  is to say that 
arguments should not bottom out in claims about attitudes.
An argument bottoms out in this way either when it must appeal to the ultimate authority 
of some group or individual, or when it is not possible to make a claim without pragmatic 
contradiction. In those cases, we can say that the claims being made are non-objective. 
In  the  former  case  they  are  interpretational claims  and  in  the  latter  case  they  are 
transcendental claims.  The former are non-objective  because they appeal  to  specific 
attitudes, and the latter are non-objective because they provide the structure of attitudes 
as such (insofar as they provide the conditions of the possibility of having attitudes). It 
is interesting to note that, because we have rejected the possibility of analytic truth, these 
transcendental claims are by definition synthetic a priori claims.
It is important to recognise that this ‘bottoming out’ should not primarily be understood as a 
matter of reaching indubitable claims about which there can be no debate. Although there 
are interpretative cases in which there is a sole authority that can settle the debate directly  
through stipulation, these are not necessarily the norm. We can engage in very complex 
interpretative debates about the beliefs and intentions of those who have such authority if  
they cannot enter the debate directly (e.g., interpreting the works of dead authors), and we 
can  engage  in  similar  interpretative  debates  about  matters  which  are  determined  by 
communal, rather than individual authority (e.g., communal norms, and claims such as 
‘Thor  is  the  son  of  Odin’).  The  structure  of  these  debates  is  just  the  structure  of 
hermeneutic rationality.  Similarly,  in the case of arguments about  the transcendental 
structure of thought itself,  although there are obvious cases of pragmatic contradiction,  
there can equally  be arguments wherein the proof  that  the denial  of  a  claim leads to 
pragmatic contradiction will  be very elaborate (and thus debatable).  We might  call  the 
structure of these debates the structure of reflective rationality.
What ‘bottoming out’ consists in is thus not a regress to claims about which there can be 
no debate, but rather, a fundamental shift in the structure of the debate itself. The only way 
to understand this properly is to examine the structure of those debates which don’t bottom 
out in this way. The major thing we have identified about these debates is that all of the 
concepts deployed within them are subject to revision, and that they are subject to revision 
in a way which is not dependent either upon specific attitudes (as in the interpretational 
case) or upon the structure of  attitudes as such (as in the transcendental case). In the 
absence of these, the only thing that can force us to revise our concepts is the world itself. 
However, there are two different forms that this kind of revision can take, and thus two 
different kinds of objective claims: empirical claims and mathematical claims.
ii) Varieties of Discourse
What differentiates empirical from mathematical discourse is the kind of claims they give 
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priority to.  Empirical  discourse  gives  priority  to  perceptually  acquired objectual 
commitments, insofar as these can force us to revise the contents of our concepts, as we 
saw in the simplified example of the concept of ‘acid’ above. Mathematical discourse, on 
the other hand, gives priority to its axioms, from which all particular mathematical truths 
must  be  derivable.  These  axioms  are  a  set  of  claims  which  specify  the  rules  of 
mathematical deduction (conditional claims), and a few basic premises from which these 
can proceed (objectual claims). Most importantly, the axioms are revisable, but they are 
not  revisable  on  the  basis  of  anything  like  observation  claims  about  independently  
accessible  mathematical objects, since everything about these objects is derived from 
the axioms. It is not exactly clear how the world forces us to revise our axioms, but I take  
this not to be a problem, but rather to indicate the possibility of a deeper understanding of 
the metaphysical status of mathematics.
It  is  interesting  to  point  out  that  at  least  some of  mathematics  is  transcendental or 
synthetic  a priori insofar as the structure of  quantification is a necessary part of the 
structure of rationality. The important point is that the axioms modify the basic structure of  
quantification,  and  in  doing  so  extend  it  beyond  simple  arithmetic  (e.g.,  by  allowing 
quantification over infinite sets). It  is thus possible to revise these modifications, but to 
understand precisely how these revisions take place is a matter of giving a full account of  
the structure of  mathematical reason. Importantly, it is the tension between  truth and 
proof demonstrated by Gödel – the fact that given any set of axioms, there will always be 
some mathematical truths which cannot be derived from them – which makes mathematics 
objective.  We might  say that  far  from bringing  about  the  ruin  of  mathematics,  Gödel 
discovered the very essence of the mathematical itself.
Returning to empirical discourse, we can show how it is possible to deploy claims about 
attitudes in a way which does not bottom out. This is in virtue of the way  observation 
claims (or perceptually acquired objectual commitments) function. We owe this insight to 
Sellars, whose account of perception refuses to take there to be some special dimension 
of content (what seems to be the case for-us) over which the perceiver has a special form 
of  authority.  If  this  were  the  case,  and we needed to  justify  claims about  what  is by 
appealing to claims about what seems to be, then empirical discourse would bottom out in 
claims about the attitudes of whoever has this special authority in each case. Sellars’ real  
insight is that claims about seeming play no important role in empirical discourse. When 
we endorse the observation claims that others make (e.g., ‘It is snowing outside’), we do 
do so on the basis  of  a  kind  of  authority  we ascribe  to  them,  namely,  a  testimonial 
authority that we give to anyone who can  reliably identify the sort of state of affairs in 
question (e.g.,  reliably discriminating between types of weather).  However,  this kind of 
authority  is  provisional,  and  this  means  that  it  is  possible  to  put  into  question  the 
inference from an observer’s reliability under usual conditions to the conclusion that their 
attitude reflects the way the world is in this case. 
The  crucial  point  is  that  arguments  about  whether  an  observer’s  reliability  warrants 
endorsing their observations in a given case are arguments about the observer’s causal 
dispositions,  the  environmental  factors which  affect  them,  and  the  objects these 
dispositions are triggered by. These are not claims about attitudes, and this means that 
empirical discourse does not bottom out in the way that interpretational or transcendental 
discourse does. Of course, such arguments will inevitably have to depend upon further 
observation claims, but all such claims can in principle be put into question, even if they 
cannot  all  be  put  into  question  at  once.  This  is  a  special  and  rather  limited  case  of 
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suspending representation, insofar as it involves a revoking provisional authority over 
observation commitments in precisely the way that we revoke the provisional authority we 
have  over  the  content  of  our  concepts.  There  can  also  be  more  general  cases  of  
suspending  the  use  of  empirical  concepts  in  order  to  examine  the  mechanisms 
underlying their application. For example, we might suspend all  uses of the concept of 
‘aura’ to  examine  whether  there  are  any reliable  mechanisms underlying  its  common 
usage. In the absence of such mechanisms we would do well to deny that it is a genuine 
empirical concept at all.
So, the question remains: what exactly about the structure of argument shifts in cases of 
bottoming out? In the case of interpretational discourse, something is added, namely, the 
ability to use claims about attitudes as reasons on the basis of non-testimonial forms of 
authority. In the case of transcendental discourse, something is  subtracted, namely, the 
ability to use any claims other than those about the structure of thought itself. Reflective 
reason involves a  bracketing of all claims other than those about the very structure of 
reason itself. On this basis, we can now see that the four forms of discourse we have so 
far identified form a hierarchy, in which claims from the higher forms of discourse may be 
deployed as reasons in the lower forms, but not vice-versa. They are ordered from highest 
to lowest as follows:  transcendental discourse >  mathematical discourse >  empirical 
discourse >  interpretational discourse. We can also represent this as a  partitioning of 
the set of truth claims:-
One could take this setup to suggest that we could do away with interpretational discourse 
entirely, but this is not exactly true. All discourse necessarily involves the possibility of 
interpretation, both of individuals and groups. On the one hand, discourse depends upon 
the  possibility  of  navigating  the  commitments  one’s  interlocutors undertake  by  their 
utterances.  On  the  other,  discourse  depends  upon  the  possibility  of  navigating  the 
communal norms constituting the secondary dimension of conceptual content discussed 
earlier. Strictly, one need only be able to do these things implicitly. However, just as in the 
case  of  concept  revision  discussed  earlier,  the  potential  for  acquiring  the  vocabulary 
necessary to do so  explicitly,  namely,  by engaging in interpretational  discourse about 
individuals and groups, is implicit within theses abilities.
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iii) The Ideal of Objectivity
Moving on, it is necessary to show why the set of objective truth claims is an ideal subset 
of what we take to be true. The reason for this is that claims are not included within the 
set,  but  rather  excluded from  it,  and  the  process  of  excluding  them  is  potentially 
indefinite. What this means is that we take claims to be objectively true by default, but 
that  we are under  an  obligation to  continuously  separate  out  whatever  non-objective 
claims we find within this default set. This process of separation is potentially indefinite, not 
only  because  it  involves  recursively suspending  our  claims  in  order  to  examine  the 
concepts deployed in them, but because, as noted earlier, such suspensions must always 
be performed  locally, and thus require that one use some concepts to examine others. 
This means that although there is nothing that cannot  in principle be suspended in this 
way, in practice we will never be able to suspend and examine all of our concepts. The 
task of separation is never finished.
What we can take from this is that objectivity is an ideal implicit within the very structure of 
truth. All discourse aims at truth, and the basic structure underlying this is what I’ve called 
the withdrawal of authority. This is involves all of those engaged in the discourse giving 
up authority over their claims in order to grant such authority to the object of their claims. 
This is always abrogated to some extent by  conceptual suppression, wherein we hold 
fixed  the  primary  content  of  some of  our  concepts,  in  order  to  make  this  withdrawal 
possible.  However,  we  can  see  that  the  underlying  ideal  is  that  of  maximising 
withdrawal.  This  is  why  we  strive  to  remove  authority  from  absolutely  everyone  by 
default, and thus why claims are taken to be objective by default. It is only when debates 
bottom out in the ways discussed above that we separate them out, but even here we still  
strive  to  limit  the  relevant  authority  as  much  as  possible.  The  very  structure  of  truth  
compels us to divest ourselves of authority over the claims we make to the greatest extent  
it is possible. This means that we are compelled to talk about the world as it is in-itself.
Now, one could still  maintain that it’s possible to be involved in no objective discourse 
whatsoever, by holding that one could just engage in transcendental and/or interpretational 
discourse to the exclusion of all else. However, there is a good argument against this. As 
we’ve  explained,  some  form  of  interpretation  is  implicitly involved  in  all  discourse 
(including  transcendental  discourse),  and  interpretational  discourse  just  makes  this 
explicit. We’ve also showed that interpretational discourse can deploy objective claims as 
reasons,  but  not  vice-versa.  The additional  insight  is  then that  to  be properly  explicit, 
interpretational  discourse  must deploy  such  objective  reasons.  In  the  interpretational 
debates about  both individuals and communities one can always be forced to  provide 
objective  claims  about  what  they  have  done that  license  us  to  ascribe  certain 
commitments to them. For instance, debates about what an individual believes can always 
regress to arguments about what sentences they have actually uttered, and debates about 
communal norms (i.e., about what one should do) can always regress to claims about the 
practices of that community (i.e., about what they actually do). Interpretational discourse 
thus always has some grounding in objective matters.
What this means is that one cannot be fully explicit about  anything unless one can talk 
about  the  way  the  world  is  in  itself.  Given  that  the  potential  for  such  explicitness  is 
contained within  all  discourse,  this  means  that  the  very  structure  of  thought  and  talk 
implies that there must be a way the world is in-itself. This amounts to a transcendental 
deduction of objectivity.
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3. Towards Transcendental Realism
However, although this is an adequate defence against the correlationist intuition, it does 
not yet amount to a demonstration of transcendental realism as it was defined earlier. This 
is because the latter holds not only that there is a way the world is in-itself, but that there 
is a real structure of the world in-itself. I’m now going to provide a brief argument for this 
kind of full-blooded transcendental realism.
First of all, we can agree with Brandom that the world is the totality of what is true, and 
that  our  picture of  the world is  just  those claims that  we take to  be true.  However, 
because we have provided a purely formal account of the distinction between objective 
and non-objective truth, in terms of an ideal subset of what we take to be true, we can now 
draw a distinction between the world and the Real:-
The World: All that is the case. The totality of all that is true.
The Real: All that is really the case. The totality of what is objectively true.
We  can  then  distinguish  between  the  formal structure  of  the  Real,  which  is  just  the 
structure of thought about objective  matters of fact, and the  real structure of the Real, 
which  is  the  structure  of  the  world  as  it  is  in-itself.  The former  is  a  transcendental 
(synthetic a priori) and thus non-objective matter, whereas the latter is properly objective 
(synthetic a posteriori). The former is the object of the critique of metaphysics, whereas 
the latter is the object of metaphysics itself. To repeat the distinction:-
Formal Structure of the Real: The structure of discourse about the Real. It is the structure 
of our picture of the Real as opposed to the structure of our picture of the world, or the 
formal structure of the ideal objective subset of what we take to be true, in distinction from 
the set of what we take to be true.
Real Structure of the Real: This is the structure of the world as it is in-itself. This is the 
essential structure of the world as distinct from its contents, or what happens to be in the 
world.
We can then say that, because the ideal of objectivity is part of the structure of truth as 
such, we are compelled to move from the formal structure of the Real to the real structure 
of the Real. Rather than treating the question ‘What is the Real?’ (or ‘What is the world in-
itself?’) as a question about the structure of our attitudes, we must treat it as an objective  
question, the answer to which is  independent of our attitudes. In short, this means that 
the structure of thought implies that there is a real structure of the world which is not only  
independent from, but also in  excess of the structure of thought. This is the essence of 
transcendental realism.
Part IV: Kant’s Revenge
In  the  main  part  of  this  essay  I’ve  provided  an  analysis  of  the  dialectical  terrain  of  
contemporary realism, located the potential for a new position within it – transcendental 
realism – and then provided the outline of an argument for it. In this final part of the essay,  
I’m going to work out some of the consequences of this position in more detail, and further 
situate in relation to the historical tradition. Specifically, I will show how it recapitulates and 
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modified many of the important insights of Kant’s philosophy. The moral I would like to 
draw from this is that far from rejecting the critical turn that Kant instigated, the real aim of 
contemporary  metaphysics  should  be  to  radicalise it.  It  is  precisely  only  by  properly 
performing the  critique of metaphysics that  we may properly attend to metaphysics 
itself, and we may only do this from a genuinely transcendental perspective.
1.   From General to Transcendental Logic 
The first point to make is that the move from the formal structure of the world to the formal 
structure of the Real is analogous to Kant’s move from what he calls  general logic to 
transcendental logic.
Kant identifies general logic as that which describes the form of thought in abstraction from 
all  possible content,  which is to say,  in abstraction from its applicability  to  objects.  In 
contrast from this, transcendental logic deals with the form of thought in abstraction from 
the  content  of  particular objects,  but  in  accordance  with  the  content  of  objects  in 
general.  The various forms of judgement which constitute general logic, understood in 
terms of their applicability to objects, are then converted into categories, which constitute 
transcendental  logic.  The  process  by  which  this  is  achieved  is  what  Kant  calls  a 
metaphysical deduction. Taken together, the categories also constitute the concept of 
an object in general, or the transcendental object.
i) The Categories
The formal structure of the world, as I have defined it, is just the formal structure common 
to all discourse. It is governed by a generic notion of truth, which does not yet discriminate 
between different kinds of truth. Within it we can find various other  generic concepts, 
which play the same role as Kant’s logical forms of judgement. These include existence, 
predication, relation, identity, essence, modality  (in its  various forms),  ground and 
consequence, number, part and whole, among others. These are abstract logical forms 
which  can  be  deployed  within  any  discourse,  including  non-objective  interpretational 
discourse such as fictional discourse. The move from the formal structure of the world to  
the formal structure of the Real involves thinking these notions in their applicability to real 
objects (or entities). 
This means that in each case the generic concept gets split in two, into one which applies 
to constituents of the Real and one which does not. For instance, the notion of  generic 
existence is split into the notion of entity and pseudo-entity, and the notion of generic 
predication is split into the notion of property and pseudo-property. This split allows us 
to  make  sense  of  the  first  two  classical  debates  discussed  earlier,  as  the  questions 
become:  ‘Are  numbers  pseudo-entities?’ and  ‘Are  values  pseudo-properties?’.  In  both 
cases we can modify the deflationary realist position in a systematic way:- 
Entity:  An  object is  an  entity  iff we  take  there  to  be  some  claims  about  it  that  are 
objectively true of it (modified from the Quine Thesis; it is interesting to note that this is 
very close to Kit Fine’s solution to the problems of Quine’s approach).
Property:  A  predicate is  a property  iff we take some ascriptions of it  to entities to be 
objectively true (modified from the McDowell Thesis).
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This also lets us make better sense of the notion of a aspect of the structure of the world, 
or an aspect of the Real. In effect this breaks down into a question about whether or not 
some aspect of our talk about the world is also an aspect of our talk about the Real. There 
can be aspects of the Real which are not reducible to entities and properties just because 
there are categories other than those of entity and property, such as that of modality.
However, there is a very tricky issue here with regard to precisely how we define the notion 
of real object (or entity) used to define the notion of category above. The difficulty stems 
from the  fact  that  there  are  two  kinds  of  objective  truth  which  constitute  the  Real  – 
empirical and mathematical – and thus ostensibly two corresponding kinds of object. My 
solution here is to say that mathematical objects are  not real, or that there aren’t  any 
mathematical entities. This might seem like an ad hoc move, but there is a genuine reason 
underlying  it.  It  regards  an  important  difference  between  empirical  and  mathematical  
discourse. In empirical discourse, we grant authority to objects themselves to force us to 
revise not only our claims about them, but also the content of the concepts we apply to  
them in those claims.  In  mathematics,  the objects discussed do not  have this  kind of 
authority. Not only what these objects are but which of them exist is completely derived 
from the axioms, and this means that they cannot play a meaningful role in revising those 
axioms analogous to the role empirical objects play in revising our concepts of them. One 
way of looking at this is to say that a mathematical object is not an in-itself in the way that 
an empirical object is. Another way would be to say that mathematical claims are weakly 
objective,  whereas  empirical  claims are  strongly objective.  We must  then  modify  the 
above categorical definitions to refer to strong objectivity, rather than objectivity per se. 
This has the consequence of answering the question of the reality of mathematical objects 
a priori: mathematical objects are pseudo-entities.
This move makes sense given the fact that, as I mentioned earlier, mathematics is at least  
partly transcendental, or synthetic a priori. The structure of quantification is part of the the 
basic logical structure of thought, and this means that arithmetic and the mathematical 
objects it discusses, namely, the natural numbers, can’t be seen as radically independent 
of our attitudes. This means that there is an important way in which my position is in 
agreement with Kant, but also an important way in which it breaks with Kant. On the one  
hand, I am in agreement with Kant in treating the objects of empirical discourse as the 
primary objects of knowledge, and thus taking the categories as solely applying to them. 
On the other hand, I am in disagreement with Kant insofar as I take mathematics to be 
more than simply synthetic  a priori, and thus take it to genuinely constitute a part of the 
Real.
Nonetheless, even if we recognise that the mathematical is part of the Real, there is still  
the  question  of  how  it  is  part  of  the  formal structure of  the  Real.  My  provisional 
suggestion is that the formal notion of an axiom, which functions to modify the synthetic a 
priori structure of quantification in a potentially revisable way, is the crucial notion here.  
However, this notion cannot be a category in precisely the same sense that existence is a 
category,  insofar  as  it  does  not  have  the  same  direct  application  to  real  objects  (or 
entities).  Nonetheless,  there  is  a  good  sense  in  which  mathematics  is  applicable  to 
entities, as repeatedly evidenced in the natural sciences. As such, I will draw a distinction  
between  empirical  categories and  mathematical  categories.  I  will  not  provide more 
examples of mathematical categories here, but I suspect that there are others. As should 
be obvious, a much more thorough study of the structure of mathematical rationality in 
its relation to empirical rationality is required in order to properly flesh out this position.
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ii) Mathematising the Aesthetic
It  is  nonetheless  interesting  to  note  that  this  split  in  the  formal  structure  of  the  Real  
between  the  empirical  and  the  mathematical  mirrors  Kant’s  division  between  the 
transcendental logic and the transcendental aesthetic. Whereas the former deals with 
the categories, or  pure concepts,  which provide the very form of the conceptual,  the 
transcendental aesthetic deals with space and time, or pure intuitions, which provide the 
very form of intuition. The really interesting point is that not only did Kant take the whole of  
mathematics  to  be  synthetic  a priori,  but  that  he  took it  to  be  derived from the  pure 
intuitions  of  space  and time.  The position  I  am proposing  allows us  to  modify  Kant’s 
approach here in at least three ways:-
1) The Sellarsian account of perception allows us to deny that there is a distinct kind of 
representation,  such as  intuitions,  which must  be subsumed under  concepts, 
and thus to deny that there are anything like pure forms of intuition.
2) We can thus hold that  mathematics is  properly  conceptual,  but  that  there is  a 
distinction between mathematical and empirical concepts (and likewise between 
pure concepts or categories).
3) We  can  thus  invert  the  Kantian  story,  holding  that  space and  time must  be 
understood in mathematical terms. However, because mathematics is nonetheless 
an objective discourse, this means that the Real can in some sense  force us to 
revise our mathematical axioms in order to properly understand the real structure of 
space  and  time.  This  resolves  Kant’s  inability  to  deal  with  both  non-Euclidean 
geometry and the Einsteinian space-time that requires it.
The final consequence of this position is that although we must perform a metaphysical 
deduction of  the  categories  in  a  manner  similar  to  Kant,  the  corresponding 
transcendental deduction of the validity of the categories must be very different. Kant’s 
transcendental deduction aimed to show the necessary applicability of the categories to 
the  forms of intuition, and thus the necessary applicability of  concepts to  intuitions. 
However, the model provided here contains no such split between concepts and intuitions. 
Instead,  the transcendental  deduction,  which  was already sketched earlier,  consists  in 
demonstrating the necessity of objectivity. In essence, it involves demonstrating that we 
cannot think without thinking about the Real.
There is one remaining problem for this deduction, and it rests on another question about  
the interface between mathematical and empirical discourse. We have provided a brief 
argument to the effect that it is not possible to  explicitly engage in  transcendental or 
interpretational discourse without also engaging in empirical discourse, but it might still 
be possible to hold that one could explicitly engage in mathematical discourse without in 
turn  engaging  in  empirical  discourse.  Indeed,  I  earlier  posited  a  hierarchy  in  which 
empirical  claims could not  be deployed as  reasons within mathematical debates.  This 
would seem to suggest that there could be autonomous mathematical reason, in a way 
which would undermine my attempt at a transcendental deduction of the categories.
The  response  to  this  problem  is  to  distinguish  mathematical  computation from 
mathematical discourse. The former simply works out the consequences of a given set of 
axioms in an algorithmic fashion, but cannot allow for the kinds of axiom revision which is 
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necessary for full fledged mathematical discourse. If we can then show that axiom revision 
necessarily  involves  empirical  discourse,  we  will  have  shored  up  the  transcendental 
deduction  I  have  proposed.  The  key  to  this  is  to  show  that  there  is  a  secondary 
dimension to the content of mathematical claims, just as there is in the content of other 
claims, and both that this is essential to the structure of axiom revision and that it can only  
be made explicit through interpretational discourse, which can in turn only be made explicit  
through empirical discourse. Unfortunately, this can only be demonstrated by carrying out 
the more in depth study into the structure of mathematical rationality recommended above.
What emerges from this story is that in order to pursue the genuinely  Neo-Kantian (or 
perhaps Hyper-Kantian) strategy I have been outlining, we need to tell a much more in 
depth  story  about  the  relation  between  the  primary  and  secondary  dimensions  of 
conceptual content. There lies the key to the transcendental deduction.
2. The Question of Being
Kant  is  remembered  more  for  his  critique  of  metaphysics than  for  the  actual 
metaphysics he expounded. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that Kant thought 
philosophy did not end with critique, but that critique is only a means to the proper pursuit  
of  metaphysical  knowledge.  This  is  an  idea  that  I  have  been  advocating  strongly 
throughout the whole of this essay. However, although much has so far been said about 
what the critique of metaphysics consists in, little has been said about what metaphysics 
itself consists in. In the last section I outlined the move from the formal structure of the 
world to  the  formal  structure  of  the Real,  which is  the  main part  of  the  critique of 
metaphysics, in this section I will outline the move from the formal structure of the Real 
to the real structure of the Real, which comprises the whole of metaphysics.
I) Heidegger’s Project
The other figure who must be brought in at this point is Heidegger, who perhaps has the 
deepest  vision of  the nature of  metaphysics after Kant.  In order to expound this,  it  is 
necessary  to  be  clear  about  the  fact  that  Heidegger  initially took  himself  to  be  doing 
metaphysics, and indeed, to be doing it more thoroughly than the metaphysical tradition 
that preceded him. His early work was focused upon ontology, which aims to provide an 
account of the Being of entities (das Sein des Seiende), or that which defines entities as 
entities. Following the Aristotelian tradition, he took this to be part of metaphysics, but he 
deviated  from  the  scholastic  variants  of  this  tradition  in  taking  it  to  be  the  core of 
metaphysics.
Heidegger also followed the Aristotelian tradition in conceiving the question of Being as a 
matter of unifying the different senses in which ‘Being’ is said. For Aristotle, these were the 
being of the categories (including substantiality, spatio-temporality, quantity, quality, 
etc.),  potentiality and  actuality (modality), the possession of  accidents (predication), 
and being-true (truth). Despite rejecting Aristotle’s manifold of senses, Heidegger never 
established his own definitive list. Nonetheless, there is good evidence that he saw the 
problem of defining entities  qua entities in terms of uniting the different senses in which 
‘Being’ could be said of them.
However,  Heidegger’s  real  innovation  over  this  tradition  was  to  see  the  potential  for 
approaching the question, in a way independent of any given list of senses of Being, within 
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the tradition itself. He did this by carefully reconstructing the idea of metaphysics as that  
which asks after entities as a whole as such. This means that metaphysics in general is 
concerned with entities as a whole and with entities qua entities in its guise as ontology. 
Heidegger  then  diagnosed  the  inherent  problem  with  the  tradition  as  onto-theology, 
namely,  its  tendency  to  understand  both  of  these  in  terms  of  entities.  Traditionally, 
metaphysics ends up understanding entities as a whole in terms of some privileged entity 
(e.g., God) which functions as the ground of their existence, and understanding entities 
qua entities  in  terms  of  some  property  of  entities (e.g.,  Physis, Logos, Hen, Idea, 
Energeia, Substantiality, Subjectivity, Objecitivity, the Will, the Will to power, the Will to will,  
etc),  which he calls  beingness (Seiendheit).  Heidegger’s own strategy was to try and 
locate the structure of entities  qua entities (Being) within the structure  of the whole of 
entities.
Now,  Heidegger  called  this  structure  of  the  whole  ‘world’,  and  understood  it  in 
phenomenological terms  as  a  temporal  horizon  projected  by  the  thinking  entity,  or 
Dasein,  within  which  entities  are  given.  This  is  what  underlies  the  early  Heidegger’s 
identification  of  phenomenology and  ontology.  This  early  approach  failed,  precisely 
because, in attempting to locate Being within the structure of this temporal horizon, it made 
Being completely  dependent  upon Dasein.  Heidegger’s  mid  to  late  work  replaces  the 
notion of world with a more complicated structure, in which Dasein’s projection of a world 
is in  strife with a fundamental excess (called  earth) which it can never fully assimilate. 
This structure is articulated in various ways (including as the fourfold of gods, mortals,  
earth and sky), but we will lump all of these together under the heading of Ereignis. 
Ultimately, Heidegger abandoned the original Aristotelian question, coming to the position 
that there cannot be an answer to the question of entities qua entities, in the sense of an 
answer that  would overturn all  the various conceptions of  beingness the metaphysical 
tradition has provided. Instead, he took it that  Ereignis presents the structure underlying 
the succession of historical epochs within which these conceptions of beingness emerge, 
and that we must overcome metaphysics by describing this structure. The development 
of  Heidegger’s  thought  can thus  be understood in  terms of  the  way  he switches  the 
reference of  the term ‘Being’ from the unifying structure of  entities  qua entities to  the 
structure of  the  givenness of  entities as a whole.  This  is  a  move from the  Being of 
entities to Being as such, from Sein to Seyn, or from Sein to Ereignis.
ii) Beyond Heidegger
Now, we must reject Heidegger’s position both early and late, insofar as in both cases it 
collapses  back  into  some  from  of  correlationism.  However,  we  can  accept  many  of 
Heidegger’s  innovations  over  the  Aristotelian  tradition.  The  parallels  between  these 
insights and the position I’ve so far been articulating will become clear shortly, but it is first 
important to point out where the most important divergence from Heidegger is to be found. 
The position I’ve been articulating advocates a thoroughly  representational account of 
thought, as opposed to the presentational account of thought that Heidegger inherits from 
Husserl.  This  means  that  we  cannot  view the  structure  of  the  whole  of  entities  as  a 
phenomenological horizon within which entities are given. We must nonetheless accept 
Heidegger’s point that whatever this structure is, it cannot be understood in terms of some 
kind of privileged entity.
The natural way to move beyond Heidegger can be seen by attending to the other name 
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he gives to this structure of the whole in both his early and late periods: truth. What this 
indicates is that the natural replacement for the presentational notion of world/Ereignis is  
the  account  of  world  that  Brandom takes  over  from Wittgenstein’s  Tractatus.  On  this 
account, the world is all that is the case, or the totality of what is true, and the totality of 
what we take to be true is our representation of the world. We can then understand the 
Heideggerian strategy for answering the question of Being as seeking to unify the different  
senses in which ‘Being’ is said of entities in the real structure of the Real. Moreover, we 
can understand the question itself as seeking the underlying unity of the various aspects 
of the formal structure of the Real, which is to say the unity of the various categories in 
their applicability to entities (or real objects). This lets us formulate the question of Being in 
a way independent of any given list of categories or senses.
In essence, what this shows us is that Heidegger’s question of Being, when shed of its 
phenomenological trappings, coincides with the task of  metaphysics as we have so far 
defined it – to move from the formal structure of the Real to the real structure of the Real. 
Furthermore, we can draw a series of additional insights from this fact:-
1) The move from the formal to the real structure of the Real can be understood as 
uncovering the underlying unity of the various categories in their applicability to 
entities. This indicates that we cannot properly understand the various aspects of 
the Real that the categories correspond to in isolation from one another.
2) Heidegger’s  claim that  we must  have  some  pre-ontological  understanding of 
Being in order to answer the question of Being is satisfied by this account, insofar  
as the formal structure of the Real is  implicit within the structure of thought as 
such.  Indeed,  we can identify  this  pre-ontological  understanding with  what  Kant 
calls the concept of an object in general, or the transcendental object.
3) We must avoid understanding the real structure of the Real in terms of a privileged 
entity (i.e.,  onto-theology). For example, this means we must reject both Leibniz 
and Spinoza’s account of  the world,  in which God either plays a privileged role 
(Leibniz) or is taken to be identical to the world itself (Spinoza).
However, although these insights help us flesh out the account of metaphysics provided 
above, we still do not have an adequate idea of what it is to move from the formal to the 
real structure of the Real, or, indeed, how to do it. The rest of this section will try to sketch 
an answer to these questions.
iii) Metaphysical Concepts
The answer to the first question lies in the fact that, if it is to get at the real structure of the 
Real, metaphysics must be an objective discipline. This means that there must be some 
sense  in  which  the  world  can  force  us  to  revise  our  metaphysical  claims and  the 
metaphysical concepts that constitute their content. The relevant question is this: what 
are these metaphysical concepts? The answer is that they are the concepts which pick out 
the  aspects of  the world to which the various  categories correspond. The categories 
provide the  form of these concepts, to which metaphysics adds  content,  and it is this 
content which the world can force us to  revise,  even if  the categories themselves are 
fixed.  Metaphysics  is  thus  a  matter  of  interpreting  the  content  of  the  categories,  or 
developing our pre-ontological understanding of Being into an understanding of Being as 
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it is in-itself.
It is helpful at this point to provide an example. I will pick the category of modality, insofar 
as  it  highlights  the  difference  between  the  transcendental  realist approach  and  the 
deflationary realist approach discussed earlier. The deflationary realists about modality 
(Lewis and Brandom) take the world to have a modal structure, but they take this structure 
to be exhausted by the  semantics of modal discourse about the world. As such, Lewis 
takes  there  to  be  possible  worlds and  Brandom  takes  there  to  be  incompatibility 
relations between predicates and between states of affairs. The transcendental realist on 
the other hand is able to interpret the  metaphysical significance of  the semantics of 
modal discourse, rather than simply taking it to reflect the structure of the world.
For  example,  one  could  be a  Spinozist  about  modality,  and hold  that  there  is  strictly  
speaking  nothing  other  than  the  actual world,  and  that  whatever  happens  is  strictly 
determined,  but  that  there  are  nonetheless  real  modal  features of  entities,  such as 
capacities (or affects). This position holds that whichever capacities are actualised are in 
some  sense  necessarily actualised,  but  that  our  talk  about  possibility nonetheless 
makes sense, because it plays the role of individuating the capacities of both individuals 
and general kinds. A Deleuzian might then add that capacities are not the only modal (or 
virtual) feature of entities, but that there are also tendencies, which are individuated by 
our  talk  about  probabilities.  This  would  be  a  further  example  of  interpreting  the 
metaphysical significance of a category implicit within the structure of our thought and talk 
about the world.
What all of this means is that there are a series of metaphysical questions corresponding 
to whichever categories we locate through the metaphysical deduction: What are entities 
really? What are properties really? What are essences really? What relations really? What 
is modality  really? Etc. In each case, the ‘really’ indicates that what is sought is the real 
structure of the corresponding aspect of the Real, rather than the formal structure of the 
aspect of thought about the Real.
We can see that this schema is the consequence of breaking the reciprocity of the sense-
dependence  Brandom posits  between  the  structure  of  the  world  and  the  structure  of  
thought. Just as understanding the structure of thought is necessary but insufficient for 
understanding structure of the world, so it is for the various pairs of fundamental concepts 
Brandom located: we must understand the concept of  singular term to understand the 
concept of  entity, but there is more to understanding the latter than understanding the 
former; we must understanding the concept of  predicate to understand the concept of 
property, but again there is more to properties than the structure of predication, and so on 
for  the  various  other  concepts.  There  is  thus  an  important  correspondence,  and  an 
essential gap, between logical concepts and metaphysical concepts.
However, a proper critique of metaphysics should not only give us an idea of what it is to 
do metaphysics, but also how we should go about doing it. It is in relation to this that the 
first insight we drew from Heidegger rears its head. We can’t properly understand any of  
these  various  metaphysical  concepts  in  isolation from  one  another.  We  require  a 
systematic picture of the real structure of the Real, or a  unified account of Being. The 
critique  of  metaphysics  must  thus  be  able  to  show  us  how  metaphysics  can  be 
approached in  such a  systematic  way.  I  do  not  claim to  be  able  to  fully  answer  this 
question here, but I believe that I can point to where metaphysics must begin.
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iv) Metaphysics and Ontology
The crucial point is that the task of metaphysics, or the question of Being, is to unify the 
various categories in their applicability to  entities.  This is a point common to both the 
Aristotelian  formulation  of  the  question  of  Being,  and  to  the  Kantian  conception  of 
categories. What it means is that the category of real existence (or the concept of entity) 
has some form of priority in relation to the other categories. It is by first asking ‘What are  
entities?’ that we can get a grip on the other metaphysical questions we must tackle. This  
does not mean that this question can be answered independently of the others, only that it  
should be our entry point into thinking about them. 
However, this seems to contradict Heidegger’s Aristotelian interpretation of the question 
regarding  entities  qua entities.  Surely,  this can only  be answered by the question of 
Being as a whole? The answer to  this  is  yes  and no.  As we have just  admitted,  the 
question of  what  entities  really  are cannot  be answered properly  in  isolation from the 
various  other  question  which  make  up  the  question  of  the  underlying  unity  of  the 
categories. However, there is a way of understanding the question which gives it a kind of 
relative autonomy from the question of unity. This is to understand it as asking after the 
beingness of entities, in precisely the way that Heidegger castigated the metaphysical 
tradition  for.  This  means  understanding  the  narrow  form  of  the  question  ‘What  are 
entities?’ as  a  matter  of  abstracting a  general  concept  of  entity  from the  totality  of 
entities given to us by empirical discourse. For example, one might take all entities given 
by the natural sciences to be understandable in processual terms, and therefore take it 
that  entities  are processes.  One  would  then  proceed  to  answer  the  various  other 
metaphysical questions in relation to this, for example, by working out how the properties 
and modal features of processes must be understood.
In short, all of this means that we can accept half of Heidegger’s critique of onto-theology, 
namely, that Being (or the real structure of the Real) should not be understood in terms of 
a privileged entity, but that we must reject his claim that one cannot genuinely inquire into 
Being by inquiring into  beingness.  This is because beingness (or real  existence) is a 
genuine aspect of Being. 
On  this  basis,  we  can  formulate  a  neat  division  between  the  various  questions  of 
metaphysics and ontology:-
The General Question of Metaphysics: What is Being? What is the real structure of the 
Real? What is the structure of the world in-itself?
The Particular Questions of Metaphysics: What are entities? What are properties? What is 
essence? Etc.
The Question of Fundamental Ontology: What are entities? What is the real structure of 
entities qua entities?
The  Questions  of  Regional  Ontology:  Are  numbers  entities?  Does  God  exist?  Do 
fundamental particles exist? Etc.
This means we have rejected the Heideggerian definition of ontology in favour of its more 
classical  definition  as  a  sub-discipline  of  traditional  metaphysics,  although  we  accept 
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Heidegger’s thesis that it is the  core of metaphysics. It is also helpful to note that what 
analytic  metaphysics calls  metontology (not  to  be confused with  what  Heidegger  calls 
metontology)  is  here  labelled  fundamental  ontology,  and  what  it  calls  ontology  is 
regional ontology. Another way of drawing this distinction, advocated by Dale Jacquette, 
is in terms of pure ontology and applied ontology, respectively.
What emerges from this section is that although, on the one hand, the radicalised Kantian 
project  I  am  recommending  does  not  reject  metaphysics,  but  must  be  seen  as  a 
continuation  of  the  metaphysical  tradition  to  some extent,  on  the  other  hand,  it  must 
nonetheless be seen as pursuing a genuinely post-Heideggerian metaphysical project. I 
have so far painted the critique of metaphysics as a matter of making explicit what was 
already to  some extent  implicit within classical  metaphysics,  in  order  to  pursue such 
metaphysics properly. However, we could also view this in more Heideggerian terms, as 
the attempt to formulate the question of Being that the classical tradition has forgotten, 
but which nonetheless provides its hidden impetus.
3. Science and Metaphysics
The other interesting feature of Kant’s philosophy is the privilege he gives to the natural 
sciences,  and  thus  his  forging  of  an  explicit  relationship  between  science and 
metaphysics. We are now in a position to work out the consequences of the account I’ve 
been providing for this relationship.
i) The Structure of Science
The first thing to note is that the account of thought and talk I have been advocating is  
committed to some form semantic holism. This is because I follow Quine and Brandom in 
rejecting the analytic/synthetic distinction, although I take myself to have improved upon 
their accounts, insofar as the Hegelian account of thought I have introduced allows me to  
explain the intuitions underlying the notion of analyticity. What this means is that, at least  
with  regard  to  the  set  of  claims  we take to  be  strongly objective (it  is  important  to 
remember that the set of what we take to be true is partitioned, and that these partitions 
have  a  hierarchical relationship),  we  can  see  our  commitments  as  constituting  what 
Quine calls a  web of belief.  This is a nice visual metaphor, where we understand our 
observational  commitments  to sit  at  the edge of  the web,  facing what  Quine calls the 
tribunal  of experience,  and then both the commitments which these depend on,  and 
those which constitute the contents of the concepts deployed within them, to sit further in,  
so that the further we get into the web the more distant we get from experience. Quine 
held that in principle we could always make changes to commitments further towards the 
core of the web in order to hold fixed commitments at the periphery.
Now, Quine initially held that logic could be found at the very core of the web, but he later  
retracted this idea. The reason for this is that logic provides the very structure of the web 
itself. Brandom has emphasised this fact very strongly: the structure of revision cannot 
itself  be revisable (at  least not  entirely).  Another way of putting this is to say that the 
structure of the web is transcendental. The important question then is this: if logic does 
not lie at the core of the web, what does? On my account, it is metaphysical concepts 
which lie at the core. This nicely mirrors Quine’s initial intuition, insofar as these are not  
logical concepts, but the metaphysical interpretations of these concepts.
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Now,  to  understand  the  consequences  of  this  idea,  we  have  to  understand  that  the 
sciences are the principal discourses through which we acquire objective knowledge. This 
is because they structure themselves around the ideal of objectivity. In the case of the 
natural sciences (or empirical sciences) they are structured around the ideal of strong 
objectivity, insofar as they make experiment the final arbiter of all claims. In the case of 
the  mathematical sciences,  they are structured around the ideal of  weak objectivity, 
insofar as they attempt to derive all of their claims from axioms which are nonetheless 
potentially revisable. Now, there has been plenty written in the philosophy of science about 
how the actual practice of science fails to live up to these ideals, or even how these ideals 
are approached in incommensurable ways through the use of differing methodologies. I 
don’t  wish to go into these debates in much detail.  I  accept  that these ideals can be 
realised  in  a  variety  of  ways  and  thus  that  science  will  always  have  to  address 
methodological questions. This is what it means for the structure of revision to itself be 
partially revisable. There is an interesting story to tell about how these methodological 
questions interface with what  I  earlier  called the  secondary dimension of  conceptual 
content, but I will not attempt to tell it here. The important point is simply that nothing about 
the difficulties of realising the ideal of objectivity detracts from the ideal qua ideal.
ii) Reciprocity and Continuity
Now, insofar as metaphysics is a matter of interpreting the categories in their applicability 
to entities, and the notion of entity is defined in relation to the notion of strong objectivity, 
there  must  be  an  important  relationship  between  metaphysics and  natural  science. 
Indeed, we can see that metaphysics  depends upon natural  science. This is because 
metaphysics does not describe the Real, but the real structure of the Real. Describing 
the Real is the job of science, and metaphysics is thus dependent upon it for its material. 
To describe this  more concretely,  insofar  as metaphysics must  begin by abstracting a 
general concept of real existence from the totality of real entities, it requires science to 
provide it with the set of entities it must abstract from. It is only in virtue of this connection  
to natural science that metaphysics can claim objectivity, because it is only through this 
connection that it can potentially be forced to revise its concepts.
However, the relationship is more complex than this. Metaphysics is not something that 
appears after natural science, but is always already implicit within it. This can be seen by 
appealing to  the metaphor  of  the web of  belief,  which  provides the  ideal structure of 
natural scientific inquiry. The transcendental structure of the inquiry implies that the core of 
the web is always there, even if  it is more or less developed, or more or less explicit. 
Metaphysics is implicit within the ideal of objectivity, and science is structured by this ideal,  
therefore  metaphysics  is  implicit  in  science.  We can  even  see this  in  the  practice  of  
science itself.  Einstein’s supplanting of the Newtonian picture of the universe is a truly 
metaphysical  revolution,  insofar  as  it  obliterates  the  absolute  conception  of  the 
metaphysics of  space and  time that were more or less implicit within it. The Darwinian 
revolution in biology continues to challenge the way we think about the very notion of 
types of entities (and thus of essence), and complexity theory is forcing us to revise the 
way we think about part-whole relations. These are all cases in which science is already 
doing metaphysics, it  is simply not doing it  in a fully  explicit manner.  The task of the 
critique of metaphysics is precisely to make it explicit, so that it can be done properly.
What all of this means is that metaphysical discourse is actually a well-defined subset of 
empirical  discourse.  It  also means that the relationship between natural  science and 
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metaphysics is not one-way, but a matter of reciprocal influence. Metaphysics plays the 
role of  organising the most fundamental concepts deployed within the natural sciences, 
and thus can play a very positive and explicit role within them, but in doing so it must also 
be  sensitive to  the  results  of  those  sciences,  because  experimental  results  and  the 
theoretical innovations which follow them can ultimately force its revision. In essence, we 
can say that metaphysics and science are  continuous, but this need not imply that the 
distinction between them is at all vague.
iii) Mathematics and Metaphysics
The  final  question  to  explore  is  that  of  the  relation  between  mathematics and 
metaphysics.  There is not too much that can be said here, given that I  have already 
admitted that a more in depth study of the structure of mathematical reason is required, so  
as  to  describe  the  structure  of  the  revision  of  both  mathematical  concepts and 
mathematical axioms, through which we can determine precisely what the mathematical 
categories are. However, there are a few remarks that can be made. First of all, it must be 
the  case  that  mathematical  categories  play  some  role  in  metaphysics,  insofar  as 
mathematical concepts can be  applied to entities, and metaphysics is just a matter of 
unifying the categories in their applicability to entities. Indeed, there is a good sense in 
which the primary content of many of the empirical concepts deployed within the natural 
sciences is in part mathematical (e.g., wave-form, chemical equilibrium, allele frequency 
distribution,  etc.).  This  is  possible  because  mathematical  discourse >  empirical 
discourse.
Now, the applicability of mathematics to entities  in themselves is an important issue in 
contemporary  continental  metaphysics,  and  is  ostensibly  the  problem  that  motivates 
Meillassoux’s  speculative materialism.  I  think  there is  at  least  one point  of  common 
ground between Meillassoux, Badiou and the position I am articulating here. Both of them 
hold that mathematics does not describe a special domain of entities (i.e., mathematical 
objects), but that it instead describes the Being of all entities. This is in broad agreement 
with my position, insofar as I take mathematics to describe the Real without describing any 
entities. The difference between our positions is that they take Being to be exhausted by 
the mathematical, which I think misses the real point of metaphysics.
4. Fundamental Deontology
The most powerful of the criticisms originally levelled at Kant, by none other than Fichte,  
was that the Critique of Pure Reason could not account for the possibility of the very form 
of  knowledge  it  exemplified.  This  lead  to  a  series  of  attempts  by  different  figures  to  
establish both an account of the nature of critical knowledge and a method for achieving 
it, culminating in Hegel’s attempt to create a completely presuppositionless philosophy, 
and Husserl’s attempt to create a purely descriptive phenomenology. Each of these in its 
own way strove to achieve a kind of critical immanence lacking in Kant’s work. I will bring 
the essay to a close by contemplating how the project I have outlined can meet this ideal 
of immanence.
i) Pragmatic Contradiction Revisited
I  have  already provided a  partial account  of  the  nature  of  critical  knowledge.  This  is 
because  I  have  provided  a  description  of  the  basic  structure  of  transcendental 
34
discourse.  On  this  account,  transcendental  discourse  is  at  the  top  of  the  discursive 
hierarchy, meaning that transcendental claims can be deployed in all other discourses, and 
that the criterion of truth of transcendental claims is that the negation of the claim implies 
a pragmatic  contradiction.  Strictly  speaking,  this  criterion  is  too  broad.  The  kind  of 
pragmatic contradiction involved must be one which is not dependent upon anything about  
the person making the claim, meaning that claims like ‘I am talking’, the negation of which 
is such a pragmatic contradiction, should not come out as transcendental claims. 
Instead,  the  kinds  of  pragmatic  contradiction  we are  concerned  with  are  those  which 
undermine the  very  structure  of  rationality itself,  or  the  structure  in  virtue  of  which 
anyone  can  have  an  attitude about  anything.  Another  way  of  saying  this  is  that 
transcendental claims are those the negation of which would make rationality impossible, 
and thus those that represent conditions of the possibility of rationality.
For example, the claim that one need never provide reasons for one’s claims undermines 
the very structure of justification. It is tantamount to licensing bare assertion, in which the 
very fact that one takes something to be true is meant to ground its truth. This would 
amount to saying that authority is never withdrawn from the speaker. The corresponding 
transcendental  claim  is  then  that  there  must  be  at  least  some  cases  in  which  bare 
assertion is not permitted. These are all cases in which the speaker does not have some 
form of stipulative authority over the matter at hand. From this ban on bare assertion it is 
very easy to derive a ban on circular reasoning, because it involves justifying a claim by 
appeal to itself, which ultimately collapses into bare assertion.
So, when we say that the kinds of pragmatic contradiction that we are interested in are 
those that undermine the structure of rationality, what we are really interesting in are those 
pragmatic contradictions which undermine the possibility of truth. The crucial point is that 
the possibility of truth is also dependent upon the possibility of falsity, and this possibility 
is established by the  withdrawal of authority.  This is why the withdrawal of  authority 
provides  the  basic  structure  common  to  all  types  of  truth.  The  kinds  of  pragmatic 
contradiction we are interested in are principally those that undermine this withdrawal.
ii) Radicalising Scepticism
The account so far provided also suggests the beginnings of a method for elaborating the 
transcendental structure of rationality, insofar as it suggests that if one brackets all other 
claims,  one  is  left  with  transcendental  discourse.  This  follows  from  the  place  of 
transcendental  discourse  within  the  discursive  hierarchy  sketched  earlier.  This  idea 
presents an interesting connection with the projects of both Hegel and Husserl. 
Husserl’s  phenomenological  method  is  predicated  upon  the  idea  of  bracketing all 
evidence given in experience in order to provide an immanent description of the structure 
of givenness itself. He calls this an epoche, and takes it to be a radicalisation of Cartesian 
scepticism. In contrast to this, my alternative method would bracket all reasons, in order to 
provide an immanent description of the structure of rationality itself. This could equally be 
described as a radicalisation of Pyrrhonian scepticism, which is an inferential scepticism, 
rather than an evidential scepticism. This form of scepticism is more fundamental, both 
because the phenomenological position can itself be bracketed from within the Pyrrhonian 
standpoint (but not vice-versa), and because, as Sellars has showed us, we can provide 
an account of experience from within the structure of reason that has no need of notions 
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such as  givenness or  evidence  (it’s also interesting to note that the very notion of an 
epoche originates  with  the  Pyrrhonians).  Nonetheless,  there  is  plenty  to  learn  from 
Husserl’s methodological rigour in any attempt to construct a counter-phenomenological 
method.
It  is  now  a  matter  of  immense  interest  that  Hegel’s  attempt  to  create  a  truly 
presuppositionless philosophy is motivated by his encounter with Pyrrhonianism. Although 
this philosophy only comes to fruition in the Science of Logic, in which he forces thought to 
immanently think its own structure starting from the least it can possibly think (which he 
names Being), the project of the  Logic is  justified by the  Phenomenology of Spirit. The 
goal of the Phenomenology is to prove that what Hegel calls Science is the correct mode 
of knowing, as opposed to the mode of knowing he calls  Natural Consciousness. We 
gave a brief description of the structure of this mode of knowing earlier, and most of the 
results so far produced are dependent upon it. Situating the current project in relation to 
Hegel’s own project would thus be doubly enlightening.
There are two important features of Hegel’s project:-
1) The  concept  of  Natural  Consciousness  is  for  Hegel  just  the  concept  of  the 
separation of subject and object (or thought and Being), whereas the concept of 
Science is just the concept of their unity. One is the negation of the other, meaning 
that there is no ground in between the two. This means that one  must adopt the 
standpoint of either Natural Consciousness or Science.
2) Hegel takes it that Science cannot justify itself without circularity, and that it must 
instead be justified from within the standpoint of Natural Consciousness. The Logic 
begins from standpoint of Science, and thus has a single assumption: the unity of 
subject and object, or the identity of thought and Being (i.e.,  classical idealism). 
The  Phenomenology justifies  this  assumption  by  attempting  to  show  how  the 
concept  of  Natural  Consciousness  systematically  undermines  itself,  thereby 
negating itself and becoming its opposite – the concept of Science.
However, the point which is not made explicit in all of this is that Hegel is taking up the 
challenge of  Pyrrhonian scepticism.  This  challenge is  best  presented by  the  Agrippan 
trilemma:-
Agrippan Trilemma: How does one justify any claim, without a) bare assertion, b) circular 
reasoning, or c) appealing to another claim which itself must be justified ad infinitum, i.e., 
regress?
The  Pyrrhonian  initiates  this  challenge  by  asserting  the  negation of  any  claims  their 
interlocutor makes, thus creating a state of equipollence, where we must choose between 
the claim and its negation. We are then confronted by the trilemma, because to break 
equipollence, we must provide reasons to accept one or the other of the claims, and for 
whichever  reasons  we  give  for  either  claim,  the  sceptic  will  assert  their  negation, 
reintroducing equipollence and leading us into a vicious regress.
Hegel recognises that if he can justify the assumption of the identity of thought and Being, 
he will be able to carry out an immanent deduction of the structure of thought (and thus 
also  of  Being)  that  requires  no  further  assumptions  (this  is  why  the  Logic is  also  a 
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metaphysics).  The  important  thing  to  note  is  that  this  presuppositionlessness  arises 
because the very form of Science does not allow for the introduction of equipollence at all.  
Each point in the dialectical development (Being, Nothing, Becoming, etc.) is necessitated 
by the last, making it impossible for the sceptic to assert its negation. However, Hegel 
must  still  justify  the  initial  assumption  which  constitutes  the  structure  of  Science  (or 
absolute knowing), and he must do this on the sceptic’s own turf, so to speak.
Hegel’s  real  innovation  is  that  he  realises  that  the  Pyrrhonian is  not  without  his  own 
assumptions. To realise this, one must recognise that if one were confronted with a sceptic 
who  merely  asserted  the  negation  of  all  of  one’s  claims,  one  would  not  have  a 
philosophical  problem,  one  would  have  a  heckler.  The sceptical  problem is  only  a 
genuine problem when it is posed, as it is in the form of the trilemma. The sceptic must 
show how the very structure of justification undermines itself, so that what we aim at in 
making claims is by its own nature impossible. However, in order to do this, the sceptic  
must actually describe the structure of justification. Hegel attempts to defeat the sceptic 
by beating him at  his  own game,  namely,  by describing the structure of  justification, 
knowing, or claiming, better than the sceptic does, and then showing how that structure – 
which  supports  the  very  equipollence that  makes scepticism possible  –  systematically 
undermines itself, and thus justifies Science.
As we have already seen, Hegel does an excellent job of defining this structure. I would 
even go so far as to say that he describes the essence of claiming with a clarity and 
precision unparalleled in the history of philosophy. However, this does not mean that he 
has gotten it  right.  The pertinent  question is this:  how do we know that the structure 
cannot  be  described  in  a  manner  more  adequate  than  Hegel’s  account?  What  this 
question demands is a genuine method to immanently describe the structure of rationality. 
This  is  where  Hegel  falls  down,  insofar  as  he  simply  posits  his  concept  of  natural  
consciousness without presenting us with anything like criteria for assessing its adequacy. 
To  refute  Hegel  is  to  develop  such  a  method  and  to  show  his  account  of  Natural 
Consciousness wanting. This would not be to declare it incorrect, but simply to show that it 
is  insufficient,  to  show that  there  is  more to  the  ordinary  (non-dialectical)  structure of 
justification  than  he countenances  and  that  the  argument  of  the  phenomenology fails 
because of this. The proper anti-Hegelian maxim is this: Natural Consciousness contra 
Science.
What we can take from this encounter with Husserl and Hegel is that we require a method 
for  the  immanent  description  of  the  structure  of  rationality  itself,  and  that  the  way  to 
achieve  this  method  is  by  radicalising  Pyrrhonian  scepticism.  This  method  involves 
bracketing all  claims,  only  to  leave those that  are  immune from bracketing,  namely, 
transcendental  claims  about  the  conditions  of  the  possibility  of  rationality  itself.  The 
question that remains is this: what kind of claims are these?
iii) Transcendental Normativity
The answer to this is to be found by returning to Kant’s fundamental insight that thought is 
conceptual, and that concepts are essentially  rules. For Kant, thought is an essentially 
rule-governed activity. The more modern way of putting this is to say that thought is an 
essentially  normative matter.  This  lets  us  characterise  precisely  where  Husserl  went 
wrong. The systematic rigour of his phenomenological epistemology is admirable, as is the 
radicality of the phenomenological epoche. The problem is that he picked the wrong object 
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to describe:  evidence rather than  inference, givenness rather than  bindingness. The 
counter-phenomenological  method  we  require  concerns  itself  precisely  with  this 
bindingness  or  normativity.  Rather,  than  describing  the  fundamental  structures  of 
consciousness, it aims to describe the fundamental norms of rationality – those norms 
by which we are bound simply in virtue of making claims at all, or those norms that provide 
the  conditions  of  the  possibility of  rationality  itself.  In  contrast  to  Husserl’s 
phenomenology, I call this descriptive enterprise fundamental deontology.
It is only by immanently describing these transcendental norms that we can uncover the 
subset of these norms which we are bound by insofar as we make claims about the Real. 
These latter norms are just what we have called the categories. This allows us to extend 
the  narrative  I  have  given  so  far  about  the  primacy  of  epistemology in  relation  to 
ontology.  We  can  now  see  that,  in  turn,  deontology has  primacy  in  relation  to 
epistemology. The practice of critique must begin with deontology, even if it does not end 
with it. The maxim here is this: deontology is first philosophy.
It is important to point out here that this does not mean that, as Levinas claims, ethics is 
first philosophy. There are different forms of normativity, and not all norms we are bound 
by  are  strictly  transcendental  ones.  Fundamental deontology  deals  only  with  these 
transcendental norms, and thus must be distinguished from other normative discourses,  
including ethics, which would be  interpretational rather than transcendental. This does 
not mean that fundamental deontology is completely isolated from ethics. There is a good 
sense in which there must be a  critique of ethics, just as there must be a critique of 
metaphysics, and it must also proceed by describing transcendental norms. Kant obviously 
recognised this himself  (though we needn’t  accept  his own deontological conclusions).  
This critique plays the role of what is usually called meta-ethics.
Now, ideally, I should posit some basic methodological principles governing fundamental  
deontology  and  then  proceed  to  derive  all  of  the  results  provided  so  far  from  them. 
Ultimately, this is the form that the project must take, but I  will  not begin it here. I  will  
however give a working outline of what these methodological principles should be:-
The Primary Bind: This is the principle that there are  some transcendental norms. It is 
demonstrable by pragmatic contradiction, insofar as one cannot deny that one is bound by 
the same norms of argument as one’s interlocutors without destroying the argument itself. 
There can be disagreements about what we might call subsidiary norms of argument, but 
the fundamental norms must be held in common, as these are what define the argument 
qua argument.  For  example,  if  an interlocutor  points  out  that  one cannot  justify  one’s 
claims via circular reasoning, one cannot simply hold that this norm doesn’t apply to you,  
without thereby undermining the very structure of argument itself (i.e., by collapsing the 
structure of the withdrawal of authority, and thus undermining the possibility of truth).
The Principle of Correction: This is the principle that by default, one is entitled to explicitly 
correct one’s interlocutors. Argument would not be possible if one was not able to correct 
one’s interlocutors in the manner of the above example, because pragmatic contradiction 
could never be made explicit. However, if one is to do this, one must therefore be able to 
explicitly state the transcendental norms from which the pragmatic contradictions follow. It  
is this principle which underlies the fact that transcendental claims can be deployed in all  
other forms of discourse. Although there are some cases in which transcendental claims 
might  play  some  kind  of  positive role  (e.g.,  mathematics,  metaphysics,  ethics),  their 
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ubiquity derives from this corrective role.
The Principle of Autonomy: This is the principle (inherited from Kant), that one can only be 
bound by commitments to which one somehow binds oneself. This means that one has 
a unique authority over which commitments one undertakes, both theoretical (objectual 
and  conditional)  and  practical  (individual  and  collective).  Norms are  just  collective 
practical commitments. 
Now, this last  principle is the most  complicated.  It  has a host  of  consequences. First, 
although one has a unique authority over which commitments one undertakes, one does 
not have a  complete authority. If one could simply specify in every case what one was 
committed to, one could not genuinely be bound by anything. For example, if one could 
retroactively  specify  the  content  of  one’s  theoretical  commitments  in  every  case,  one 
would be in the position of Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty,  able to mean anything by 
anything, and thus not able to mean anything at all (this is also the thrust of Wittgenstein’s 
private language argument), whereas if one could retroactively specify the content one’s 
practical commitments, one could simply redefine one’s obligations so as to get out of any 
contract one is part of. What this means is that, in both cases, there must be a distinction 
between the force and the content of one’s commitments. One is uniquely authoritative 
over the force of one’s commitments (i.e.,  whether one is bound), but one must to some 
extent  withdraw one’s authority over the content of those commitments (what one has 
committed oneself to).
This has the result that one must be able to undertake commitments that one does not 
fully understand the consequences of. One undertakes commitments both through what 
one says and through what one does. The relevant question is to what extent one must 
grasp  the  consequences  of  what  one  is  saying  or  doing  in  order  to  be  counted  as 
undertaking the commitment. There is a very complex debate to be had here, which I will  
not go into in depth. The important point is that whatever the criteria of commitment are 
they can vary from case to case. However, there is one very special case in which one can 
have no theoretical grasp of what one is committing oneself to, and nonetheless still be 
committed. This is the case of the transcendental norms themselves. These norms form 
the  limit-case of autonomy, insofar as one commits oneself to them in virtue of doing 
anything that can be counted as rational. This is to say, one is committed to them insofar 
as one can be committed to anything. This is because they are the norms which specify  
what it is to be committed to anything.
What  all  of  this  means  is  that  arguments  about  force will  always  be  matters  of 
interpretation,  insofar  as  they concern  authority.  Arguments  about  the  content  of  our 
commitments  will  always  involve  interpretation  to  some  extent  (this  is  partly  what  is  
involved in the secondary dimension of conceptual content), but whether or not they count 
as interpretative will  depend upon whether and how they  bottom out  in  claims about 
attitudes.
Arguments  about  the  content  of  objective theoretical  commitments  don’t  bottom  out, 
arguments about the content of  non-objective theoretical commitments do bottom out, 
and arguments about the content of practical commitments split in two directions, one of 
which bottoms out and one of which can go either way. 
Arguments about what it is to do what the commitment entails can either bottom out or not 
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bottom out,  depending upon whether the content is made explicit  by objective or non-
objective theoretical commitments (e.g., what it is to heat steel to melting point, and what it 
is to score a goal in a football match, respectively). Arguments about which thing we are 
to do must bottom out, but they can either bottom out in claims about the attitudes of the 
individual who undertakes the commitment (individual interpretation), the attitudes of 
the group that determines the norm (collective interpretation), or about the structure of 
attitudes as such (transcendental reflection).
Ultimately, what emerges from the principle of autonomy is a further principle:-
The  Principle  of  Reflexivity:  The  structure  of  normativity  can  only  be  described  in 
normative terms. This is what underlies the fact that transcendental discourse is at the top 
of the discursive hierarchy. John McDowell gets at the essence of this principle with the 
phrase: “It’s norms all the way down.”
So, what we find is that the primary bind codifies the  existence (but not the reality) of 
transcendental norms, the principle of correction codifies their ubiquity in relation to other 
forms of discourse, and the principle of autonomy (via the principle of reflexivity) codifies 
their independence in relation to these other forms.
iv) Nature and Culture
If we assume that we can manage to reconstruct the results of the main part of the essay 
within the framework just presented, then we can posit an additional principle:-
The Principle of Asymmetry: The distinction between the natural realm and the normative 
realm, between Nature and Culture, is neither a natural distinction nor is it a distinction in 
some higher  term (e.g.,  Being),  but  is itself  a normative distinction.  From the side of 
culture there is a sharp divide between the two, yet from the side of nature there is none.
What this means is that we can conclusively respond to Heidegger’s challenge to Kant. At  
the beginning of Being and Time Heidegger claims that Kant has done a good job of giving 
an account of the kind of Being belonging to Nature, but that he has failed to inquire into 
the kind of Being belonging subjectivity, which his whole philosophy is predicated upon. 
This is why Heidegger’s project begins with an analytic of the Being of Dasein, which is his  
successor to the notion of the subject. Against Heidegger, and in favour of Kant, we can 
claim that the subject has no Being. The transcendental subject is a purely formal ‘I’, 
and although it may need to be indexed to some real  entity (e.g., a human being), this 
index is not a genuine property of that entity. Nor is the structure of rational subjectivity a 
real essence. This is because none of these are properly objective matters.
This also enables us to revive a some version of the distinction between facts and values. 
Facts are just  objective truths,  whereas values are non-objective truths.  However,  this 
does mean that there is a distinction between transcendental and historical values.
In  essence,  the  Real is  nothing  but  Nature,  albeit  a  nature  which  is  intrinsically 
mathematical,  because  objective  discourse  is  nothing  but  talk  about  Nature  and  the 
mathematical structures embedded in it. We are compelled to talk about the world as it is 
in-itself, but in doing so we are also compelled to leave all of the normative machinery 
(both transcendental and historical) required to talk about it out of the picture.
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v) Varieties of Criticism
The final issue to address is the status of critique itself. At the beginning of this section, I 
said that  the account of thought  presented in the rest of  the essay provided a  partial 
account  of  the  nature  of  critical  knowledge.  Despite  fleshing  out  the  nature  of 
transcendental  discourse,  this  is  still  the  case.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  although 
transcendental critique is its most fundamental form, it is not the only one. The last part of 
this section will be devoted to both defining the more general concept of critique, and to 
highlighting the other forms it can take: historical critique and empirical critique.
To do this I’m going to try and trace a critical tradition that begins with Kant and extends 
well into the 20th Century. The figures I have in mind are Kant, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein and 
Foucault, although there are almost certainly others who could be fitted into this tradition in 
some way. What unifies these thinkers is the attempt to analyse the structures of thought 
in order to diagnose systematic errors or illusions that these structures create, so as to  
free us from these illusions. For Kant, this is a matter of preventing the overextension of  
reason; for Wittgenstein, it is a matter of preventing us from running our heads up against 
the limits of language; for Foucault,  it  is a matter of uncovering the ‘historical limits of 
necessity’; and for Nietzsche, well, it’s somewhat more complicated...
The important point is that each of these figures is in some sense concerned with the 
conditions of representation, and how these conditions might distort our view of the very 
things we are trying to represent. Kant and the early Wittgenstein are concerned with the 
specifically  transcendental conditions  of  representation  –  the  ahistorical structure  of 
thought and language. Nietzsche, Foucault and the later Wittgenstein are all concerned 
with the specific historical conditions of representation – the language-games, epistemes, 
and networks of power relations that constitute the  social dimension of representation. 
Nietzsche is then somewhat unique among these thinkers (though he would find many 
allies in contemporary philosophy) in also concerning himself with the empirical conditions 
of cognition – the psychological and biological structures which make thought possible.
The account of thought I’ve so far provided gives us a way of describing each of these 
different  projects  in  a  unified  way,  in  virtue  of  the  notion  of  the  suspension  of 
representation. Representation is suspended when we hold in abeyance the assessment 
of a claim about an object in order to examine the conditions which make it possible to 
represent the object. Now, in Part III this was mainly described as a matter of bringing into 
question  the  commitments  which  constitute  the  primary  content of  the  concepts  that 
constitute the claim. However, as has been suggested at times, suspension has a much 
broader range than this.  What is common to the various forms of critique is that they 
implement  suspensions of  representation that  abstract from primary  content,  whereas 
what differentiates them are the different kinds of conditions of representation that they 
examine.
Transcendental critique is the most fundamental form of critique, insofar as the bracketing 
it must perform is the closest thing we can get to a global suspension of representation. 
As has been noted, such global suspensions cannot be used to examine the content of our 
objective concepts, insofar as one must always  use some concepts to  examine others. 
The deontological  epoche is not quite a global suspension of the kind discussed earlier, 
insofar as transcendental claims about the normative structure of discourse are immune to 
it. Nonetheless, in bracketing all other claims, it abstracts from the content of all ordinary 
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concepts in order to describe the structure of concepts as such, including the structure of  
concept revision. This is to say that it abstracts from the primary content of all concepts, 
leaving only the form of the conceptual.
By contrast, historical and empirical critique deal with the structures of specific concepts 
(or networks of concepts). However, they don’t suspend the claims these concepts are 
deployed in to examine the primary content of these concepts, but instead to examine the 
secondary content which structures the process of conceptual revision in each case (as 
opposed to the general structure of such revision). Historical critique examines both the 
networks of deference which constitute the  anaphoric dimension of content, the  social 
practices underlying the  practical dimension of content, and the sociological structures 
that both these dimensions are situated in relation to. Empirical critique examines the way 
that other empirical factors shape our practices of dealing with things and using words, 
and by extension the sociological structures they are tied up in. As such, it is harder to  
draw a crisp distinction between these two forms of critique than between them and its  
transcendental form. Both deal with historically contingent structures, and both may deal 
with specifically social structures. The real distinction lies in whether they describe these 
structures in normative (interpretational) or causal (empirical) terms, or rather, the extent 
to which they use either. In truth, both are required to some extent, and this is why it is  
hard to draw the distinction properly. In essence, the distinction depends upon whether the 
emphasis is placed upon hermeneutic or natural scientific forms of explanation.
Once more, I must admit that without a more in depth account of the nature of secondary  
content and the nature of the suspension of representation, I am unable to provide a more 
detailed account of the nature of critique. Nonetheless, we are in a position to glimpse the 
general character of the critical impulse. Critique aims to pick apart the various structures 
underlying the process of knowledge acquisition, which is both the process of acquiring 
claims  and  the  process  of  revising  our  concepts,  in  order  to  differentiate  legitimate 
constraints on this process from  illegitimate ones. It  is a kind of conceptual technics 
through which we both uncover the properly  transcendental limits of knowledge while 
removing historical and empirical impediments to it. The project outlined in this essay is 
thus doubly critical: critical insofar as it is transcendental, and critical insofar as it seeks to 
give a transcendental account of the process of  empirico-historical criticism, so as to 
facilitate critique in all its forms.
The  final  point  to  make  is  that  just  as  we  saw  that  scientists are  already  doing 
metaphysics to  some extent  implicitly,  so  it  is  that  philosophers are  already  doing 
critique to some extent. This is the whole purpose of the schema ‘philosophy of X’ (e.g., 
philosophy of science, philosophy of art, philosophy of law, etc.). Philosophers are already 
conceptual  technicians,  even  if  this  is  not  all  that  they  are.  Following  the  ideal  of 
explicitness, our goal should be to make explicit precisely what philosophers are already 
doing in these cases, so that it might be done properly, just as it has been the goal of this 
essay to make explicit what scientists are already doing. 
On  this  basis,  we  can  draw  a  distinction  between  the  critical and  the  constructive 
dimensions of philosophy, the former exemplified by transcendental philosophy and the 
latter  exemplified  by  metaphysics.  The  former  dimension  maintains  the  structure  of 
knowledge, while the latter aims to actually produce knowledge, by creating new concepts 
which order existing fields of inquiry.
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Conclusion
The  aim  of  this  essay  has  been  to  announce  the  possibility  of  something  like  a 
transcendental realism, and to do so by engaging both with contemporary debates about 
realism and with the historical tradition more broadly. In the course of it, I have not only 
defined what such a transcendental realism would be, but also provided an argument for it,  
and worked out many of the details and further consequences of it. What has emerged 
across all of this is the necessity of once more returning to the philosophy of Kant, as it  
seems we are destined (or doomed) to do every hundred years or so. However, this call  
for a renewed take on the Kantian project is motivated neither by nostalgia, nor by some 
deep seated frustration with the contemporary philosophical terrain. It is neither a call for 
novelty  for  its own sake,  nor  a  call  for  tradition for its own sake.  It  is  motivated by a 
problem that is deeper than such trite narratives. 
On the  one  hand,  against  deflationists,  anti-realists,  correlationists,  and  all  other  anti-
metaphysicians of the 20th Century, we seem to genuinely understand the significance of 
metaphysical questions. On the other, against the pre-critical metaphysicians and those 
who would return us to the era of unconstrained speculation, we are not so sure that we 
know  what this  significance  really  is.  The  only  response  to  this  is  a  critique of 
metaphysics,  which  defines  its  exercise  and  its  limits,  and  the  progenitor  and  most 
powerful exponent of that critique is Kant.
However, as I have also demonstrated, this renewal of Kantianism should also be critical in 
the more common sense of the word. There is as much in Kant that is ripe for revision as 
there is that is ripe for appropriation. First of all, following the last wave of Neo-Kantians, 
we must excise the transcendental aesthetic and the dependence upon non-conceptual  
forms of representation that it embodies. Second, we must also update both the theories of 
and the perceived relation between logic, semantics, and pragmatics underlying Kant’s 
conception of  thought,  to  adopt  the insights of  Hegel,  Heidegger,  Wittgenstein,  Quine,  
Sellars, Brandom and others. These two changes amount to a substantive revision of the 
whole of Kant’s account of thought, along the lines already discussed.
On the basis of this, we must revise the Kantian  architectonic of reason. This must be 
done by distinguishing the various forms of rationality in terms of the way they modify the  
withdrawal of authority, and thus in terms of the types of truth they correspond to. It  is  
possible to use the insights so far provided to provide such a taxonomy of truth:-
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Here we can see that the various types of objective truth can be ranked in terms of the 
extent  to which they grant  authority  to  objects,  and thus the extent  to which they are 
object-dependent,  and the types of non-objective truth can be ranked in terms of the 
extent to which they grant authority to individuals attitudes, and thus the extent to which 
they  are  attitude-dependent.  For  instance,  natural  scientific  truth  is  more  object-
dependent than metaphysical truth because the former can depend upon specific kinds of 
entities,  whereas metaphysical truth is dependent upon all  entities equally.  In a similar 
vein, subjective truth depends upon the attitudes of a specific individual who has unique 
authority,  whereas  intersubjective  truth  depends  upon  the  attitudes  of  groups  of 
individuals, none of which need have this kind of authority. Mathematical and logical truths 
are distinctive insofar as they are not dependent upon any specific objects or attitudes.
This schema is not exhaustive, insofar as there are many further subtypes of truth that are 
not presented in it. For instance, we could distinguish  ethical truth and aesthetic truth 
(the  major  concerns  of  Kant’s  second  and  third  Critiques)  as  further  types  of 
intersubjective  truth.  We  could  equally  break  down  mathematics  into  its  logical  
(quantificational) and  non-logical (axiomatic) parts, as well as breaking down logic into 
its general and transcendental parts. There is thus much work to be done in extending 
this taxonomy of truth and the corresponding architectonic of reason.
Beyond this, we must do something about the infamous notion of the thing-in-itself, the 
poor reception of  which has haunted Kant’s  philosophy since its  inception,  in order to 
retain the kernel of insight it represents while banishing its more problematic connotations. 
This  means  rejecting  any  ontological  understanding  of  the  difference  between 
phenomena and noumena, and reconceiving the latter as the concept of the ideal limit of 
the rational  process of  revising  our  theoretical  commitments,  which  can be thought  in 
relation to any given entity. However, much more needs to be said about precisely how to 
understand this limit-concept, and the relation between it and the notion of the Real.
Finally, we must establish a method (which I have called  fundamental deontology) to 
recapitulate  all  of  these  insights  in  an  immanent and  systematic fashion.  This  is  a 
daunting task, but it is one that is undoubtedly worthwhile. If nothing else, the promise of 
working out both what thought demands of us, and what the world demands of us, is too 
good pass up.
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